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The continued high percentages of skilled personnel in the
United States (U.S.) Armed Forces that are currently leaving the
service has become, not merely a personnel problem for the military,
but for the U.S. as well. Much controversy surrounds the social and
economic foundations with which the political and military estab-
lishment must deal. This thesis presents a methodology for analyz-
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institutions into the U.S. Armed Forces. The proposal in this
thesis, it is believed, could possibly drastically reduce current
manpower shortfalls in the military institutions. The jobless
parolee is a drain on the tax-structure both local and national.
An employed parolee would stop this drain by producing taxable
income. Finally, the severe problem of a revolving door-type-
recidivism which has defined solutions could possibly be partially
solved by this approach. The author admits that this approach is
unusual, yet, it is probably a valid assertion that unusual prob-
lems require creative and sometimes unusual solutions.
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The continued high percentages of skilled personnel in
the United States (U.S.) Armed Forces that are currently leav-
ing the service has become, not merely a personnel problem for
the military, but for the U.S. as well. Much controversy sur-
rounds the social and economic foundations with which the
political and military establishment must deal. This thesis
presents a methodology for analyzing the possible utilization
of selective parolees from various institutions into the U.S.
Armed Forces. The proposal in this thesis, it is believed,
could possibly drastically reduce current manpower shortfalls
in the military institutions. The jobless parolee is a drain
on the tax-structure both local and national. An employed
parolee would stop this drain by producing taxable income.
Finally, the severe problem of a revolving door-type-recidivism
which has defied solutions could possibly be partially solved
by this approach. The author admits that this approach is
unusual, yet, it is probably a valid assertion that unusual
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"... we are confronted with an untenable dilemma. It means
that new methods of evaluation, placement, and management of
personnel — all personnel — are necessary to guarantee
optimum effectiveness and efficiency."
(Myers and George, 1975)
A. PROBLEM
In recent years, the defense manpower system has become
an important part of public policy and has assumed even a
greater degree of importance as the United States (U.S.) enters
the cost conscious 1980s. The end of the draft, skyrocketing
manpower costs, reluctance of young men to enter the military
service, and a host of other factors have all served to make
defense manpower one of the key concerns of the Public, Execu-
tive Office, and Congress.
The defense manpower system complexity stems in a large
part from its magnitude and widespread applicability. It
includes four to five million people, depending on the recog-
nition of its manifest and it continues to need increasingly
higher qualified and able people to sustain its operational
and readiness posture.
In 1979, for the first time since the draft ended, all
services failed to meet recruiting goals. The Army signed up
only 90 percent of the personnel it needed; 142,300 of a goal
of 158,700. The Navy met 94 percent of its goal while the
Air Force and Marine Corps reached 98 percent. For the Depart-
11

ment of Defense (DOD) as a whole, the shortages was 24,000 of
the 362,400 needed [1] . Further, the services are losing
desirable skilled, first term enlistees and more senior expe-
rienced personnel to the civilian job market via retirement
and separation.
These trends are forcing a re-examination of popular assump-
tions about military compensation [2] . Through the decline of
military pay compared to civilian wages, service personnel
have not kept pace with the so called "traditional benefits"
of the military. A recent Pentagon study shows that as a
result of the combined impact of inflation and pay caps or
ceilings, the real buying power of the salaries received by
men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces has fallen by 11 per-
cent since 1972, the year of the last big catch-up raise [2].
According to former Secretary of Defense (1969-73) Melvin
Laird:
"... military pay must be restored to its 1972 real income
levels immediately. (This means a 17.5 percent pay increase
across the board in all grades just to catch up with the
cumulative loss in purchasing power.)"
"It would help plug up billions of dollars in the training
expense the military loses each year when trained personnel
leave the service for lack of pay ..."
"The choice confronting us is simple: either we pay salaries
high enough to retain skilled people or settle for military
less ready to fight in the future." [3]
Replacement of the young male today is a very difficult
task especially when the 18-24 year old population in the
country is declining rapidly. Appendix A explains eligibility
12

criteria for the enlistment of personnel into the U.S. Armed
Forces. The criteria covered in Appendix A are subject to
dollar constraints and laws established by Congress.
As laws are presently constituted, in order to enlist in
the U.S. Armed Forces, the young male must have a clean bill of
health, be relatively educated to a certain level, evaluated
via testing and be without a serious criminal record. What
constitutes a criminal? Is it a person with one drug bust,
or one with more actual felonies than others, or merely a
person showing recidivism in serious crime areas such as mur-
der, rape, and armed robbery? The definition of criminality
is ultra-fold. Webster's Dictionary defines a criminal as ...
a person guilty or convicted of a crime... However, one felony
conviction according to Title 10, United States Code, Section
504 (Appendix B) still allows an American to enlist in the U.S.
Armed Forces, providing the prospective enlistee is eligible
under the existing waiver system.
With a declining youth population, Congressional resist-
ance to additional expenditures on manpower cost and increased
competition from other societal institutions for the decreas-
ing supply of the nation's eligible youth makes the challenge
of the 1980s one the nation's policymakers must recognize
and meet if the U.S. Armed Forces are to stay adequately man-
ned throughout the coming decade.
This undesirable condition will require increasingly
creative recruiting efforts. Probably every tract of the
13

supply of manpower will have to be examined. This thesis
investigates the feasibility of utilizing skilled-qualified
parolees as a possible source of military manpower.
Leon Leiberg of the American Correction Association wrote,
"Creating change of any type is seldom a simple matter.
Whether the object of change in the status quo may be
resisted because of fear — fear of loss of authority,
prestige, influence, vested interest, or security. There
may be a perceived nor a device for change, yet most fre-
quently the need is not perceived nor the desire felt by
those who must change, who are most affected, and who have
the most to gain." [4]
Stated more succinctly, Professor Chester A. Wright of the
Navy's Human Resources Management Division at the Naval Post-
graduate School says, "Good wine cannot be made unless some of
the grapes get bruised and no one goes around getting turned
on by drinking grape juice, as such." [5] In short, the juxta-
position of the U.S. Armed Forces, personnel pool-wise is prob-
ably, according to Professor Wright, the most unusual in its
history in that the military eligibles are extremely limited
as to both quality and quantity. Unusual problems require
unusual approaches to a solution. This thesis addresses one
of the more unusual approaches.
B. GENERAL BACKGROUND SUPPORTING POSSIBLE FEASIBILITY OF
ENLISTING PAROLEE PERSONNEL
For hundreds of years, prisoners or even criminals as
defined earlier have been used in the defense of various
countries including the U.S. This is not a new idea. There
have been a few examples of utilizing such human resources as
14

both useful and successful tools when need dictated. There
are precedents supporting the notion of prisoners in the mili-
tary dating back to 1831. The situations as cited are not the
same situation as they exist today; however, they do provide
insight.
1. The French Foreign Legion was formed in 1831. Until
1870/ it was made up of foreign mercenaries instead of French
citizens. Frenchmen were, however, admitted illegally (The
Legion was not considered desirable for French citizens)
.
Some of them were criminals whom the French authorities wanted
to be rid of; while others were simply utilizing the Legion
as a vehicle for escaping from lives of drudgery and hardship.
Although the recruiting age was between 18-40, the legion
would accept anyone who wanted to join. No one expected the
legionnaires to distinguish themselves, but they proved to
be superior French Soldiers [6] .
2. In 1942, the U.S. Department of the Army initially
utilized some 3,000 civil prisoners from Illinois in ful-
filling some manpower requirements [7]. Later, 100,000
men who had been previously convicted of felonies served
during World War II [8] .
How well did these men indicted from prison perform? A
study was instituted and compared the parole violation rate
of the 1,3 07 men paroled to the Armed Forces to the 2,070
civilian parolees during the same period. The violation rate
was 5.2 percent for the military parolee group and 22.6 per-
15

cent for the civilian parolee group [8] . In another random
sample of 705 felons inducted, only 4.2 percent were con-
victed of criminal acts after they completed their service.
Of all the parolees from Illinois system, 87 percent received
honorable discharges from the Army [7]
.
3. In October 196 6, during the Vietnam War, the DOD revised
and lowered its entrance standards for military service and
began accepting men who would have previously been disquali-
fied because of failure to meet the mental standards; and
for physical defects which were easily correctable. This
was known as "Project 100,000" for "New Standard Men" [9],
"New Standard Men" were required to meet the same criteria
expected of others for graduating training courses [9]
.
"Project 100,000" inputs included 9.2 percent pre-service
civil court convictees of which 3.1 percent had two or more
convictions as seen by Appendix C.
C. OBJECTIVE/PURPOSE
The purpose of this proposal is to examine the feasibility
of recruiting parolees (criminal offenders) from the federal




Although federal statutes prevent parolees, probationers,
or any person under a court suspended sentence from entering
or working for the government, amendments to allow these
resources to be tapped for a possible manpower need appears
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practicable. Utilization of introductory letter accompanied
questionnaires were used as means of initiating a review of
this proposal. As shown in Appendix D, this questionnaire
solicits comments, ideas, and other pertinent data in order
to make it possible to review this unusual concept. Second,
the author talked with professors in the Human Resources,
Financial Management and Manpower area, professional military
students and civilian authorities for comments. Third, inter-
views were conducted with various representatives of correc-
tion agencies, military authorities, and professional research-
ers for the feasibility of utilizing parolees in the U.S.
Armed Forces. Fourth, data was collected from the National
Criminal Justice Institute, Department of Army Historian,
National Archives, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Defense Logistic Information Center, and various
Correction Agencies. Fifth, the data collected was analyzed
with focus on Cost-Benefit Considerations in order to make an




Manpower management is a total system. It is very complex
and generally not fully understood by most members of the
resource management community [10]
.
Chapter II identifies the projection for this decade of
the factors affecting the active force enlistment supply. It
also presents a set of alternatives to combat the declining
17

personnel supply and establishes the use of parolees as the
author's selection for further analysis. This alternative
was chosen because of the absence of current studies of the
subject.
Chapter III briefly offers some methods of selection of
civilian parolees based upon age, severity of crime, recidiv-
ism and other potential sources of manpower. Chapter IV
demonstrates the cost-benefits for utilizing skilled parolees
Chapter V analyzes criteria for success and failure of this
prospective human resource, attitudes of inmates (Soledad
State Prison) toward military service, and finally is the con-
clusions and recommendations of this research.

II. MILITARY MANPOWER NEEDS: PROJECTIONS FOR THE 1980 DECADE
"Sophisticated technological machinery means nothing without
sufficient personnel to operate it."
(Carolyn S. Davis, Librarian, Notre Dame High School,
Salinas, California)
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and identify the
current and future population projections of the 1980s, and pre-
sent those factors affecting the active forces supply of man-
power, and a set of alternatives to prevent the manpower pool
situation from dwindling below its current level of 2.1 million
personnel.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING ACTIVE FORCE PERSONNEL SUPPLY
Recent population projections issued by the Census Bureau
predict a steady decline in the military's prime manpower pool:
young men from 17 to 21 years of age. That trend is expected
to continue well into the 1990' s [11]. Figure 2-1 shows the
latest estimates for this population through FY 1990. After a
peak of 10.8 million in FY 78, the number of 17-21 year old
males will begin to decline and continue to decline through
FY 1990. The decline is modest from FY 1979 to 1982 — less
than one percent per year. However, in the years between FY
1983 and 1987, the decline increases to 2.5 percent per year.
By FY 1987, the number of males in the 17-21 year age group
will have declined by 15 percent from the FY 1978 levels. By
19

FY 1990, the number of 17-21 year old males will be 17 per-
cent below the FY 1978 number [12] .
FIGURE 2-1
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Source: America's Volunteers, A Report on the AVF , OASD,
December 31, 1978.
Many studies and analyses of military recruiting have iden-
tified a number of factors that may affect the active force
supply of manpower in the coming years. These include the size
of the youth population as discussed in the previous paragraph,
the degree of competition from other segments of the labor
force, and educational institutions; unemployment rates for
youths; military pay levels, recruiting and advertising
activities [12]
.
During the period between FY 1978 and FY 1990, the labor
force as a whole will increase by about 20 percent, but the
compositions will change as follows:
20

a. The 17-21 year old population will decrease by 17
percent.
b. The 21-55 year old population will increase by 20
percent.
c. The participation rate of women in the labor force
will increase 15 percent.
The overall growth caused by the increases in the number
of women and of the older elements of the labor force will
work to the disadvantage of youth. Youth will always be at a
relative disadvantage in the competition with the more expe-
rienced and more highly trained segments of the labor force.
Though increases in the size and participation rate of compet-
ing groups will reduce employment opportunities for youth, it
could make military enlistment a more attractive opportunity
for all segments of the youth population [12]
.
Unemployment is another factor in considering the supply
of people interested in joining the military. Table 2-1 shows
the approximate range of youth unemployment between FY 1973
and FY 1978. Prior to FY 1975-1976 period, the range of youth
employment has been limited. And, if the FY 1975-1976 expe-
rience is discounted, the range of unemployment between FY's





Unemployment Rates for 16-21 Year Old Youths




Source: America's Volunteers, A Report on the AVF , OASD,
December. 31, 1978
Analysis of historical enlistment supply data shows that
volunteer enlistments in FY 1970-1977 period have been in-
fluenced by the levels of military pay relative to civilian
pay. For instance, it is estimated that a 10 percent increase
in first term military pay relative to civilian pay would bring
a 5-10 percent increase in high quality enlistments. Similarly,
allowing military pay to decline relative to civilian pay
would bring proportionate decline in enlistments [12] . Appen-
dix E shows the comparison of military pay to civilian pay.
Increases in the recruiting reosurces were accompanied by
the increased levels of enlistments in the FY 1970-1977 time
period. However, recruiting differs from other factors in
that further increases are likely to bring less return in terms
of increased enlistment [12]. In the future, recruiting and
advertising resources will be priced to obtain a constant
share of the male high school 17-21 year old market rather
than obtaining a constant number of quality male accessions.
Other factors such as military training and travel opportunity
22

and individual preference for military service play important
roles in the enlistment decision. The factors have been rela-
tively stable and are not likely to change significantly in
the years ahead [12]. The factors discussed above, population,
changes in the work force, unemployment, military and civilian
pay levels and recruiting, explain a large part of the enlist-
ment changes in the FY 1970-1977 time period and are expected
to be the significant factors causing change in the coming
decade.
C. NEEDED ACTIONS
In order to reduce the current manpower problems, several
policy changes could be considered by the Department of Defense
(DOD) to ensure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness that
would broaden the representational base of the active forces.
These changes are as follows:
1. A standby draft
2. Laws that affect women in the military
3. Possible utilization of skilled (pretrained) parolees
4. Pay raises comparable to civilian salaries
The list is not intended to be all inclusive.
Can the Selective Service ever achieve a capability to
resume inductions within 30 days of mobilization, deliver
100,000 inductees within 60 days and 650,000 within 180 days?
Or should the DOD reevaluate its plans concerning the role of
inductees in a mobilization? These are difficult questions to
23

answer, at least within the constraints of funding restrict-
ions, the inability to conduct a peacetime registration, the
kind of draft opposition present, and the unwillingness of
Selective Service officials and Congress to consider major




The requirement for a standby draft, established by
Congress in 19 71, was based upon the following recommendations
of the Gates Commission and Nixon Administration officials:
(a) a register of all males who might be conscripted when
essential for national security; (b) a system for selection
of inductees; (c) specific procedures for the notification,
examination, and induction of those to be conscripted; (d)
an organization to maintain the register and administer the
procedures for inductions; and (e) a standby draft system to
be activated only by the resolution of Congress at the request
of the President [13]. The key phrases of the legislative man-
date are: "The Selective Service System ... shall be maintained
as an active standby organization, with (1) a complete regis-
tration and classification structure capable of immediate op-
eration in the event of national emergency and (2) personnel





2 . Women in the Military
Figure 2-2 shows the supply and demand for women in
the military from 1964 through 1994. Women represent a major
under-utilized manpower resource, especially in the enlisted
force where the recruiting market for high quality young men
is very competitive [12]
.
Prior to FY 1973 , women provided less than two percent
of the total enlisted strength; but, under the all volunteer
force, the percentage rapidly grew to nearly six percent in FY
1977, and is programmed to reach 12 percent by FY 1984. Fig-
ure 2-3 shows this growth by service. All services project
major increases in women personnel during the next five years.
The Air Force projects the highest gro th and the Marine Corps
the lowest growth [12]
.
As Table 2-2 shows, DOD plans to increase the number
of enlisted women to 208,000 by FY 1984. The Army and Air
Force each will have 80,000 enlisted women.
Table 2-2
Active Duty Enlisted Women (000)
FY 6 4 FY 6 8 FY 71 FY 73 FY 76 FY 77 FY 7 8 FY 79 FY 84
Army 8 11 12
Navy 5 6 6
Marine Corps 13 2
Air Force 5 6 10
17 44 46 50 57 80
9 19 19 21 22 40
2 3 4 5 5 8
15 29 35 41 48 80
Total_DoD 19 25 3 4 3 9 5 104 117 132 20 8_
% of Total 0.8 0.8 1.3 2.2 5.3 5.8 6.6 7.5 11.6
Enlisted
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Women are now serving in military skills previously
closed to them. Figure 2-4 shows the percentage of enlisted
positions by occupation which are filled by women. Since the
total force was 5.8 percent female , any percentage above that
level indicates higher than average concentration of women and
percentages lower than 5.8 percent indicate underrepresentation
As one can see from Figure 2-4 , the greatest density of women
is in traditional skills, the medical/dental and administrat-
ion/clerical occupations.
FIGURE 2-4
PERCENTAGE OF ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL





























While Figure 2-4 considered positions filled by women
as a percentage of all the positions in each occupational area,
Figure 2-5 shows the distribution for men. Of all enlisted
women on active duty at the end of FY 1977, 33 percent were
in administrative and clerical positions as compared to 13
percent for men. Women also had a much higher percentage in
medical/dental (18 percent) when compared to men (four percent).
Women have much lower percentages than men in electronic equip-
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Source: America's Volunteers, A Report on the AVF, OASD,
December 31, 1978.
Taking Figures 2-4 and 2-5 together, one sees that 33
percent of the women serve in administrative and clerical
29

positions, but that they represent only 13 percent of the total
positions in the occupation. While only 4 percent of men
serve in administrative and clerical positions, they fill 87
percent of those positions. Even in the traditional occupa-
tions there is room for growth in the numbers of women.
Current analysis indicates a potential to increase the
number of women in the military even further; in part because
more women want to enlist than are now accepted. But too rapid
a rate of growth can result in an imbalance of women in the
junior ranks because it takes years for recruits to be trained
and promoted into positions as qualified supervisors. More-
over, DOD cannot be certain how many women will reenlist in
those occupations in sufficient numbers to meet career force
requirements. For example, retention by DOD occupation code
for men and women is shown in Figure 2-6. Enlisted women had
much higher retention in traditional skills than men, but
much lower in nontraditional skills.
While Figure 2-6 showed comparative retention of men
and women who enlisted in FY 1973 by occupation, Figure 2-7
compares the average retention of six cohort groups. Women,
on average, are retained as well as men. Taking Figures 2-6
and 2-7 together, one concludes that women are retained at
higher rates than men in skills more traditionally identified
with women and at lower rates in the non-traditional skills
such as electrical equipment repair, technical, mechanical
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One could argue that the Services should concentrate on re-
cruiting men and women into the skills where they have the
best retention prospects, but such a policy would have some
questionable equal opportunity implications. In recent years,
the Services have been striving to increase the numbers of
women in nontraditional occupations.
As the number of women in the military increases,
women in greater numbers are beginning to enter job fields
that have been traditionally held only by men. Many of these
are in the combat environment. While women are not assigned
to positions requiring close combat on a regular basis, num-
erous jobs related to combat can be efficiently and effectively
filled by women [12]
.
Currently the federal statutes prevent women from
serving in combat arms or related jobs. According to the Army's
policy, "Women are authorized to serve in any officer or en-
listed specialty, except some selected specialties in any
organization level and any unit except infantry armor, cannon
field artillery, combat engineer, etc."
In the Navy, the issue is somewhat different from the
Army. Section 6015 of Chapter 10 United States Code preclude
women from serving on ships engaged in combat missions nor may
they be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hos-
pital and transport ships. Later, Congress modified Section




Expanding the roles of women and the number with force
broadens the recruiting base for the Armed Forces. As
shown by recent experiences of the Army, women are demonstrat-
ing that they are capable of playing an even larger part in
national defense. Repealing the laws that affect women in the
military will be a significant step forward in opening the
military services to those American women who want to serve.
It will probably reduce the effect of the declining youth pop-
ulation on military recruiting.
3. Possible Utilization of Pretrained Parolees
An American youngster, as discussed in Chapter I, with
a criminal record can enlist in the United States (U.S.) Armed
Forces, provided that he or she is eligible under the existing
waiver system. This possible enlistment of skilled parolees
in the Services is another avenue of manpower to reduce the
shortages of the Armed Forces throughout DOD. This source has
never been utilized in the U.S. before except as mentioned
earlier during the manpower crisis of World War II and Vietnam.
With the increasing shortages of personnel in the military,
declining youth population, and the draft registration opposi-
tion by various groups, the author feels that the U.S. will
fall behind its goal of maintaining an active force of 2.1
million personnel.
Recent events have increasingly drawn attention to the
plight of prisons and prisoners in the U.S. Criminal offenders
have been glorified and villified, but their needs, and those
33

of the community to which they relate, have not been met.
While the great debate between recrimination and rehabilita-
tion continues, most concerned observers seem to recognize the
need, if not the means, to make productive persons of convicts.
[15] .
A major concern of those involved in the rehabilitation
of adult offenders has been the difficulty newly released of-
fenders encounter in securing suitable employment. Employment
appears to be crucial for successful post-release adjustment,
and authoritative sources claim that unless ex-offenders have
legitimate opportunities to work that many of them will return
to crime [16] . Typical of these claims is that of the recent
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals, which posit that "many individuals turn to illicit
activities when they are faced with insurmountable obstacles,
or meager returns from legal economic endeavor. Some of these
people could be deterred from crime if the accessibility and
attraction of the straight life were increased for them." [16]
According to the U.S. Department of Justice Sourcebook
of Statistics, many ex-convicts or parolees produce the neces-
sary skills, intelligence and physical qualifications to qualify
for the U.S. Armed Forces compared to a control group of new
recruits. The author reviewed several parolee records at the
Salinas Parole Office, Salinas, California and those records
indicated that the average educational attainment is 13.6 and
an IQ ranging from 110 through 130. In the author's opinion,
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-his type of human resource is not a marginal product, but a
qualified individual which is stigmatized by society.
The problem of finding employment for discharged of-
fenders continues to remain the biggest obstacle in the path
of rehabilitation for the criminal offenders throughout the
world. The stigma of imprisonment, the rejection of the of-
fender by the free community, the absence of extensive indus-
tries, the difficulties of communication, of leaving one's
heme town and migrating re a new area, ail contribute tc mak-
ing the problem cf finding employment almost: insurmountable.
[17] .
An experiment has beer, tried out in Sri Lanka and
seems to offer a ray of hope for discharged offenders to make
use of the skill and training they receive in the correctional
institution. The experiment was the formation cf a Co-opera-
tion Society of discharged offenders T.-:'r.c skilled masons and
carpenters, and employing them on the building and maintenance
program of the Department of Prisons. The sense of pride and
achievement displayed by these men was remarkable. It is note-
worthy that the rate of absenteeism was very lew. These were
men who had been rejected and refused employment although they
had the necessary skills. In Sri Lanka the problem of unem-
ployment is acute, and there is a strong prejudice and reluct-
ance of society to employ discharged prisoners, such men may
well look upon this method as the best solution to their prob-





As defined in the experiment of Sri Lanka, one of the
ex-prisoners said,
"... if we are given a chance, we are certainly willing and
prepared to contribute our mite to the measures taken by
Government for the improvement of our country."
The potential impact of employment restrictions is
enormous. 10 million arrests are made annually in the U.S.,
as many as the combined population of New Orleans, New York
City, Providence, San Francisco and St. Louis. A fourth of
the population holds some kind of nontraffic arrest record,
and some 1.8 million persons are within the corrections system
on any given day [18] . Licensing restrictions doubtless con-
tribute to unemployment among ex-offenders, whose joblessness
rate far exceeds that of other persons in the labor market.
Unemployment, in turn, is correlated with recidivism; research
indicates that the unemployed or underemployed parolee is
"four" times less likely to succeed at parole than his or her
fully employed counterpart [18]
.
It is clearly in society's as well as in the ex-
offender's interest to eliminate needless restrictions that
limit the ex-offender's ability to earn a decent income, con-
tribute to society, and stay out of prison.
4 . Pay Raises Comparable to Civilian Salaries
There is growing agreement among civilian and uniformed
military officials and members of Congress that the personnel
situation is bad, and getting worse and that military personnel
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have lost their purchasing power. But there is less agree-
ment on what to do about it. A recent Pentagon study con-
cluded that an increase of $5.5 billion in military pay would
be required to restore the balance between military and
civilian pay that existed in 1972 when last major adjustment
was made. Billions more would be needed to offset the infla-
tion-induced erosion of such benefits as travel, pay, medical
care, and flight pay [2]
.
Any increases in pay would help to alleviate some of
the inequities now suffered by military people. Whether pro-
posed increases by Congress will be enough to stem the tide
of experienced people leaving the service is, in the view of
close observers, doubtful. Melvin R. Laird, who was Secretary
of Defense when the All-Volunteer System was set up in 1973,
says the nation has "reneged" on a commitment to keep military
pay competitive with civilian wages. Laird gives these
examples:
a. An E-4 plane handler on the nuclear powered carrier
(Nimitz) , deployed to the Indian Ocean during the current
Iranian crisis, normally works about 100 hours per week.
He handles F-14 aircraft, which cost 25 million dollars
per plane, and helps operate a 2 billion dollar ship, yet
he makes less per hour than a cashier at McDonald's.
b. A chief petty officer, E-7, on the Nimitz, with 17
years of service, makes the same salary as a janitor on
a union scale and puts in twice as many hours.
Such disparities between military and civilian pay, Pentagon
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officials say, are driving the services into a two-way squeeze.
At the bottom end, the Armed Forces face increasing difficulty
in attracting volunteers [2]. At the upper end of the scale,
both officers and noncommissioned officers are leaving the ser-
vice in unpreceded numbers. What alarms officials most is
the exodus of those with only a few more years to serve before
becoming eligible for retirement.
"Senate Votes 11.7% Pay Hike, Benefits"
(Navy Times, 14 July 1980)
If this provision is passed through the House and signed
by the President, it would by comparison be not nearly equal to
civilian pay raise for the same period. For instance, the
recruit's monthly pay is $448.20 vs civilian minimum pay of
$520.80. With the 11.7 percent increase that would bring the
recruits' pay to $501.30 and $524.39 at 17 percent pay increase.
This still does not take into account the lost purchasing power
addressed by Melvin Laird. Historically, as pay raises are
given, prices of consumer goods and services increase, causing
salaries to be behind purchasing power of the civilian sector.
Many analysts of the Republican (Reagan) Platform believed that
in order for military scales to be equal to civilian pay, a
17 percent pay raise should be given versus 11.7 percent. How-
ever, the question still begs an answer, "Will this be enough
for retention?" According to the Congressional Budget Office's
Staff Working Paper, Costs of Manning the Active Duty Military
(1980), the Carter's Administration pay proposals for fiscal
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year 1981, (although have cleared Congress and signed by the
President) despite pay increases, would be insufficient to meet
the services' need for enlisted recruits and maintain recruit
quality in the 1980 and 1981. Nor would it be sufficient to
stem the decline in the numbers of career personnel. If the
Carter Administration's 1981 policies were to continue for the
next five years, problems in recruiting and retention would
probably continue or worsen [19]
.
D. CONCLUSION
The evidence developed in this chapter indicates that the
U.S. Armed Forces continue to need qualified personnel to serve
and protect its national interests. As one approaches this
decade of the 1980s, innovations must be found to improve and
adequately man the technological equipment.
With the needed changes discussed by the author to reduce
attrition and increase the use of women, and possibly skilled
parolees, the Services should be able to achieve both quantity
and quality of accessions at least through the 1990s. Addi-
tional changes that are consistent with this concept are avail-
able to meet uncertainty in the supply of future recruits.
Chapter III presents and discusses the use of skilled
parolees and some possible procurement and training methodol-
ogies for implementing this valuable human resource, a source
of personnel that is considered untapped, uncounted, and unused
in this society today.
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III. POSSIBLE PAROLEE PROCUREMENT METHODOLOGIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to positively modify and if possible
remove the impediments inherent in the term "criminal" via a
definitive look at the term, its connotative and real meaning.
In addition the author will analyze the possible utilization
of those individuals to whom this term applies as a needed
manpower source for the United States (U.S.) Armed Forces. In
doing so, the author discusses the general background of the
criminal offender to include the problems of a discharged
prisoner, and the definition of a criminal. As comparative
media, some attempts made by the British government to remove
those impediments which act as obstacles in the social, polit-
ical, and economic path of the offender are included. There
are also comments made by inmates at the Soledad Correctional
Training Facility, Soledad, California which were elicited
by the author during an on sight visit. The selection process
of moral waivers and the selection criterion for skilled
selectable parolees in the U.S. Armed Forces will be discussed.
Also, the most efficient procurement and training methodologies
for inducting and integrating such individuals into the military
service will be introduced. Operation Second Sweep, another
potential source of manpower will be presented to the reader




Harry E. Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, in their article on
resocialization of the offenders state:
Anyone who has worked with prisoners or ex-prisoners
realizes that the majority of them have lost the self-
esteem upon which they must rely to make good in a highly
competitive world. Self-esteem can bolster their con-
fidence; when they lack it they can be demoralized. The
old prison crushed the prisoner; the "new prison" buoys
up their confidence but is rarely able to bridge the gap
between the institutional experience and the stigma of
the free community. There are many areas of community
life in which discharged prisoners find themselves handi-
capped and stigmatized.
It is a grim fact that total punishment for crime
never ends with the courts or jails. None can deny that
a criminal record is a life long handicap, and it sub-
ject a marked man in our society. No matter how genuine
the reformation, nor how sincere and complete the inner
resolution to revert to lawful behavior, the criminal
offender is and remains a prisoner of his past record
long after the crime is expiated by the punishment fixed
under the criminal codes.
This traditional prejudice and distrust stalks him
at every turn no matter what crime he may have committed,
or the nature of the punishment meted out to him. It
strikes at the first offender as ruthlessly, and with as
deadly effect, as upon the inveterate repeater or the
professional criminal. It pursues those alike who have
served time in imprisonment of long or short duration,
and those who have been merely cloaked with a criminal
record in the form of a suspended sentence, a discharge
on probation, or even a fine [20]
.
As mentioned earlier, society places a stigma on the
prisoner and ex-prisoner or criminal. Exactly, what is a
criminal? The term 'criminal' denotes a person who has de-
viated from the demand of the law, or, in essence, committed
a crime.
Crime is, first of all, a legal conception of human be-
havior punishable under criminal law. Crime is also a
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dilemma a situation requiring a choice between equally un-
desirable alternatives, confronting probably all scientific
disciplines that are engaged in an unending search for the
definition of the basic concepts of crime. If the establish-
ment of criminal responsibility and fixing of guilt pose ex-
tremely difficult problems, how can one define the criminal?
The term 'criminal', as previously noted, denotes a per-
son who has deviated from the demands of the law. Yet, this
is part of the dilemma, if the subject has not been caught
and labeled as part of public record, is the individual a
criminal? These deficiencies need to be made manifest in order
to clarify the problems and procedures involved in the scien-
tific study of criminology. As H. A. Bloch and G. Giles, two
scientists in the field of criminology, put it:
The word criminal lacks rigorous references and has
often been the basis for some of the most untenable gen-
eralizations put forward about the nature of persons who
have violated the law. In popular usage 'criminal' refers
to the more obvious violators, and particularly to those
who have been declared guilty and incarcerated. But gen-
eralizations based on this group inevitably omit the more
adroit violators, those who escape adjudication and prison,
and those who commit acts which, while outlawed, do not,
for one reason or another, result in judicial proceedings.
Individuals who break the law usually do not do so
constantly and, when they do, are not always apprehended.
Even if we try to confine the use of designation to law-
breakers, there are always chronological limitations as
to how the term should be employed. Does an individual
become a criminal at the moment he breaks the law? If
so, how long does he remain a criminal? Must he per-
sistently commit crime to retain this labe, or are
notorious single acts of crime? [21]
In Britain, as well as in the U.S. and other nations,
society believes that a criminal offender lacks the ability
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to be a responsible and productive citizen. As a result, the
convicted offender bears an invisible version of the mark of
Cain and the individual's criminal history is classified as a
public document in many jurisdictions [22] . Although the
offender may be rehabilitated or reformed, the offender cannot
escape the prison record. These individuals find that a
criminal record substantially decreases their alternatives in
virtually every area of life. Employers are unwilling to hire
•criminals'; insurers are unwilling to issue to offenders the
fidelity bonds necessary for many jobs; government licensing
agencies deny offenders the licenses necessary for certain pro-
fessions; and attorneys rely upon conviction records to impeach
the offenders when they serve as witnesses in judicial proceed-
ings. As a consequence, according to Neil P. Cohen;
Persons with criminal records are under great pressures
to conceal their past. But this desire for concealment
creates a dilemma. If the offender lies about his past,
he violates general moral prescriptions against lying and
risks severe penalties if he is caught in the lie. If the
offender is honest about his criminal record or history,
he incurs discrimination which years of exemplary, crime-
free living cannot prevent [22]
.
In 1974, the British Parliament acted to ease the burden
of this dilemma by passing the Rehabilitation to Offenders Act
[22] . This was a measure intended to eliminate discrimination
against certain classes of rehabilitated offenders by prohibit-
ing employment discrimination against them and by authorizing
them to conceal and deny their conviction. The basic mechanism
of the Act is secrecy. The provisions of the Act attempted to
bar public knowledge of the criminal convictions of the
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offenders who have 'lived down 1 their criminal history via
serving time stipulated by a court of law. In order for the
offender to benefit from the Act, the individual must complete
a rehabilitation period without being convicted of an indict-
able offense. Once an offender completes the required period
of rehabilitation of six months to ten years, the individual
becomes a rehabilitated person and shall be treated for all
purposes in law as a person who has not committed, been charged
with, or prosecuted for a crime. In short, this act allows
former British criminals to lie about their past. [22]
Does society have a moral duty to show forgiveness and to
welcome the offender back among us? As well stated in the Book
of Mark in the Bible:
"But if you do not forgive, neither will your Father
which is in Heaven forgive your trespasses."
[St. Mark 11:26]
In most instances, criminal offenders remain in the crim-
inal arena because they are constantly denied access to society's
legitimate opportunities and are, as a result, compelled to
violate those values that are deemed lawful.
In face-to-face interviews at Soledad State Prison in the
summer of 1980, the author found that the majority of inter-
viewees who are prospective parolees or criminal offenders
tended to say, " ... I have the credentials, the qualifica-
tions, the experience to perform in the midst of society, but
if I am always denied 'the way back', where is there to go?
... sure, I was 16 then, but now that I'm 25 with nothing to
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show but my educational achievements, my valuable experiences
that I shared with others, and dreams of a second chance ..."
[23] . "There is nothing to look forward to in getting out on
parole or a complete sentence . . . with unemployment up and all
other avenues exhausted for work and assistance, I saw a way
of providing support to my family in order to survive, but I
got caught." [23] Words to this effect are common.
Although laws vary in each state of the U.S. a criminal
offender as defined earlier is subject to constraints that are
established by Congress and Statutory Provisions. If a parolee
violates parole by some minor infraction of the law, he or she
may be reconfined or may be subject to additional convictions
thereby carrying more than one felony count. The question that
begs an answer is, "How can offenders successfully adjust to
civilian life, especially when there are so many structural
impediments in current law?" A possible solution to this ques-
tion will be discussed later in this chapter and is the main
thrust of this thesis.
C. SELECTION PROCESS OF MORAL WAIVERS
Current guidelines for the enlistment of waivers, individ-
uals with one felony, one or more misdemeanors, minor offenses
or any combination of these factors, in the U.S. Armed Forces
are published in each services recruiting manual. The manual
is written to cover all 50 states. Figure 3-1 shows the flow
of non-prior service applicants enlisting for service. Al-
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does contain information encompassing all the Services recruit-
ing methods
.
To begin, the applicant applies for enlistment at the
various recruiting stations. The application carries all in-
formation on the individual including any conviction of felon-
ies, misdemeanors, or minor offenses such as a traffic viola-
tion. The Director of Accession Policy, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense states in accordance with the law:
Persons convicted of a single felony count may re-
quest a waiver to permit their enlistment in the Armed
Forces (Title 10, U.S.C. 504). The waiver process is
not automatic, and appeal is based on the individual
case. Waivers are not granted to individuals who have
been convicted of two or more felonies. One of the
considerations in determining whether waiver will be
granted is the individual's ability to successfully
adjust to civilian life for a period of time following
the release from judicial constraint [24]
.
If applicants have two or more felonies, probation, parole or
court suspended sentence, they are automatically disqualified
for enlistment. If an applicant, through the recruiting pro-
cess, possesses only one felony conviction, misdemeanors, or
minor offenses, he or she must waive their rights in order for
the service to investigate the offenses and to have the ap-
plication processed further. Accordingly, applicants with a
police record incurred as a juvenile are eligible for enlist-
ment without waiver considerations. Other applicants' files
are sent to higher headquarters for approval or disapproval,
based on the character and/or condition of offenses. If
approved, the applicant is processed accordingly. The oath is
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received for enlistment in the service and a contract is
signed to complete the process.
"Congress has the authority to amend laws that it
sees fit ..."
[Modern Federal Practice Digest, Statutory
Provisions of Congress]
The author feels that perhaps the criterion for selection
in the U.S. Armed Forces should be no more than a 'gut' feeling
for an individual whom a recruiter deems qualified and possess-
ed of the capacity for enlistment in order to decrease manpower
shortages. If a parolee or criminal offender could enlist in
the various services, the armed forces could probably meet
their future manpower goals. It is the contention of this
author that there is nothing magical about the numerical two,
as a cutoff point, especially if age at the time the offense
was committed is considered, severity of offense etc., are
omitted as criterion to process a quality individual in the
U.S. Armed Forces.
D. SELECTION CRITERION FOR PAROLEES
In evaluating parolees for selection, severity of crime,
age, recidivism, and skill qualifications should be the choice
criteria for enlisting these individuals in the manpower
structure
.
Severity of crimes in the author's definition are non-
violent offenses as described in Appendix F, and situational
offenses. Situational offenders are defined as persons being
imprisoned for the first time and for the first offense, per-
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sons who have committed crimes under pressure of circumstances.
For example, persons heavily in debt, who see no way out of
their dilemma may resort to robberies. These offenders make
up a significant portion of the non-counted U.S. (census)
population. Of the estimated 179,191,000 people in the United
States in 1975, over 1.5 million were non-violent offenders [25]
The age criteria should be that of the Department of Defense
(DOD) normal recruiting qualifications for enlistment. The age
is currently 17 and the prospective recruit should not have
reached his 3 5th birthday, depending on whether the individual
is a veteran [26]
.
Recidivism, like many other English words, has many inter-
pretations. Webster's Dictionary defines 'recidivism' as a
tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of
behavior. Recidivism has no clear cut meaning in the criminal
justice system. However, recidivism can mean many things and
can be based on various factors, which helps explain why
recidivism rates for criminals vary from such figures as 80 per-
cent down to five percent. The figure depends upon how one
counts three things: the event (arrest, conviction, parole
revocation) , the duration of the period in which the measure-
ment is made, and the seriousness of the behavior to be
counted [27] . Most researchers feel that the rate of recidiv-
ism identifies the success or failure of a program.
The author defines a recidivist as a one-time returneee
for this criteria. Offenders interviewed at Soledad State
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Prison tended to feel that they could not adjust to society
when society itself looks for additional evidence that pres-
sured them to violate parole, probation, or be prosecuted
for a crime that fits their characters or previous convictions.
Many offenders felt that lack of money and employment were
the primary reasons for their rearrests.
Skill qualification is another criteria that should be
used in the enlistment process of parolees. Throughout the
military today, the services have many billets that could be
filled by parolees via On-the-Job Training for familiarity
and transitioning. Many offenders have the necessary skills,
training, or experience that would qualify them into a billet
without ever being sent to a specialized school. For instance,
Figure 3-2 shows the breakdown of certified type vocational
courses. Each institution has a varying number of vocational
and technical courses [28] . Appendix G indicates that occupa-
tional and apprenticeship programs could qualify an individual
for employment and in this case, the military service.
E. POSSIBLE TRAINING METHODOLOGIES FOR PAROLEES
To incorporate skilled parolees into the military system,
three alternatives are discussed as follows:
Alternative one :
Assign and train parolees at the U.S. Retraining Brigade
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1 . Alternative one :
Assign and train parolees at the U.S. Retraining Brig-
ade (Army Correction Program), Fort Riley, Kansas.
The Army Correction Program is derived from the DOD
Instruction 1325.4, entitled Treatment of Military Prisoners
and Administration of Military Correction Facilities (M&RA)
,
dated October 7, 1968, aimed at establishing uniform policies
and procedures relating to military prisoners and the adminis-
tration of the places of correction as mandated by Title 10
United States Code. The instruction states that discipline
should be administered on a corrective rather than on a puni-
tive basis. Its primary mission is to conserve manpower by
restoring military offenders to duty as competent and well
motivated soldiers. A corollary mission is to screen out and
separate from the Army by administrative means, those who after
careful observation and study, are determined to be unsuitable
or unfit for the military service. The U.S. Army Retraining
Brigade (USARB) , during its eleventh year of operation has
returned over 32,000 military prisoners to active duty [29].
The USARB training cycle has a duration of ten weeks.
However, the tenth week is taken up with out-processing of
52

trainees in preparation for their departure for the units to
which they are assigned [30]
.
The Army motivational training phase consists of five
one-week modules. Prisoners are helped to recognize, control,
and solve those problems which exhibit successful duty perform-
ance and to believe that good performance brings pleasant
results. A prisoner must earn a minimum number of points each
week to progress to the next module. If the minimum points
are not earned, the individual is placed with a new team, a
new group of prisoners at different barracks, and repeats the
module.
Analysis of the five modules shows that 23 hours of
instruction are provided in subjects such as U.S. Government,
race relations, sex education, and monetary management.
Another 19 hours are set aside for group counseling. The re-
maining instruction encompasses physical fitness , drill and
ceremonies, marksmanship, field hygiene, marches and bivouacs.
It also includes four days of training on the rifle range where
prisoners are allowed to use live ammunition [30]. Military
retraining is the final phase of the retraining center program.
For the prior service parolee (veteran) , this alter-
native or particular program mentioned above, would not change.
These individuals have the basic idea of what the military
services are all about. This does, however, depend upon how
long it has been since these individuals have been discharged.
The non prior service parolee would need additional (basic)
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training, possibly four weeks of physical fitness, military
courtesy, and military law and then could be processed to the
second and final phase of the retraining brigade program. As
an incentive toward good performance, the Army Retraining
Center suspends prisoners pay forfeitures as they progress
through the program. As for an incentive for parolees good
performance, these individuals could receive pro-rated pay of
an E-l (Pvt) salary and some freedom within the regulations.
These individuals must have the desire to complete the pro-
gram and be processed to active duty accordingly.
Since April 1975, the USARB has undergone fundamental
changes in organizational, operating procedures and training
activities. Recalcitrant, non-restorable prisoners were
separated early in the program from those prisoners who were
both deserving and desirous of undergoing training and return-
ing to duty as competent productive soldiers. Gateguards
were removed and gates were permanently opened in accordance
with the new objective of placing more responsibility on the
prisoner. Capitalizing on the 'second chance' offered by the
Retraining Brigade placed the onus for success on the prisoner
rather than on the training cadre. Prisoners were placed on
their honor and remained confined solely by means of self-
imposed restraint. In short, many for the first time in their
life were made responsible for their own behavior. Training
changed from a Basic Combat Training-oriented program (BCT) to
one of human self development, self confidence, self respect,
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capability development , and desire to withstand negative peer
pressure in favor of independent judgment and acceptable mili-
tary and social behavior [30] .
The parolee would be able to pay for travel to and
from Fort Riley since each is given nearly $200.00 plus any
additional amount for work performed while in the prison.
This amount could be adjusted in order to assist the parolee.
A sampling of 4 percent of the graduates from this
new program (USARB) , who had served in their new units for at
least two months, revealed that 96.1 percent remained on active
duty or had been granted honorable discharges. Of the total
sample, 86.6 percent were rated average or above, and 52.2
percent were rated outstanding or above average and recommended
for promotion ahead of their peers.
In 197 6 USARB ' s operation was changed. Under the new
program each prisoner is processed through a two-week period
of initial processing, at the termination of which a decision
is made as to whether or not the individual should be dis-
charged as non-restorable or be allowed to carry on with the
retraining program [30] . Perhaps this initial processing
method could be utilized as a screening method for potential
parolee participants.
2. Alternative two :




Once parolees are evaluated at the recruiting station,
they are then processed accordingly in basic training as a
regular recruit. These individuals are integrated along with
non-criminal offenders and offenders with waivers. In order
to prevent these individuals from being labeled, it is best
to keep their original record secret. That is, no one should
hav^ access to it. The purpose of this procedure is to allow
the individual an incentive to perform well among his or her
peers without having that "record" tailing and/or possibly im-
peding their progress. The parolee is treated as an equal to
other recruits. The individual is made aware of all rules
and regulations of the services. However, if the parolee
fails to perform, the individual is subject to elimination
from the program and may be returned to the civil parole
office system, and possibly at their own expense. The govern-
ment should not be liable for any claims made by this indiv-
idual if one fails to complete basic training and this should
be stated in the contract as another incentive.
In the opinion of the author, the obligation period
for enlisted parolees should be a minimum of three years which
is the standard enlistment term of normal recruits, depending
upon their parole status and other conditions. The period may
help the individual to erase the stigma that the individual
carries. Once basic training is completed, the parolee is
processed to on-the-job training programs for two to three
weeks. The purpose is to familiarize the individual with the
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with the billet that would be filled. (This is based upon the
skill level possessed in Appendix G) During this period the
parolee will be subject to all conditions expected of them,
such as mess duty and other normal field chores.
As previously mentioned, parolees should be treated as
equals to regular recruits. They should be evaluated on an
equal basis. At the discretion of the commanding officer,
parolees could be allowed to qualify for additional schools as
long as they have met the requirements of the program. The
only constraint that this individual would be subject to is
that if one failed, the individual may be returned to prison
for a longer term than originally granted. This is based upon
serious offenses that are committed while in the service or at
the discretion of the commanding officer.
The basic premise that large numbers of military offen-
ders can be restored to duty with a satisfactory success rate
was demonstrated by the Army during and immediately after World
War II. Under the restoration program in that period, about
42,000 general court martial prisoners, convicted of civilian
crimes as well as military offenses, were restored to duty
from the Rehabilitation Centers in the U.S., the U.S. Dis-
ciplining Barracks and its branches, and the Disciplinary Train-
ing Centers overseas. The restoration program was successful
to the extent, that at least 90 percent of those restored did




3 . Alternative three :
Work-Release Program.
What is a work-release program? A work-release program
is the permission of an offender to leave the institution to
work for pay in the community, but requires that individual
to return for the leisure and sleeping hours. Work-release
programs are used in 41 states [27]. The working situation is
almost surely better paid and provides better training than
the work in prison and it gives the offender an opportunity to
show responsibility in the use of a limited amount of freedom.
Normally, work-release is granted near the end of the prisoner's
term so that it becomes both preparation and testing for
parole [27] .
This alternative could be utilized to screen a poten-
tial parolee for the enlistment in the armed forces, prior to
the acceptance by the recruiting station. Since there will
be a critical shortage of manpower in this decade as previously
mentioned, this source could possibly be used to work on those
jobs that are short of skilled individuals and thereby possibly
releasing other regular military personnel for other critical
jobs areas. A work-release program could reduce the average
cost per year per offender as much as $10,000 - an amount the
individual could have earned through employment [32].
The economic benefits are plain, work-releasers earn
money so they help support their families (who might otherwise
be on welfare) and pay taxes, thus aiding the economy and
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society. Additional benefits will be discussed in Chapter IV
of this thesis.
4 . Summary
In order to incorporate these alternatives , recruiters
at recruiting stations would need additional guidelines for a
parolees 1 acceptance into the military system. Figure 3-1 dis-
cusses the current procedure for waivers. This flow could be
utilized with minor modifications and the incorporation of the
parole decision-making structure by Parole Boards. If the ap-
plicant is on parole, etc., as seen in Figure 3-1, then the
applicant would waive the rights for investigation. The in-
vestigation in this case is conducted at the local Parole
Division of each state, where all records of these individuals
are compiled into one file. The applicant would continue to
be processed. The recruiter or the commanding officer of the
recruiting district may want to incorporate the Parole Board
selection decision guideline to approve and disapprove this
prospective applicant.
These guidelines as seen in Appendix H and I, are in
the form of a two axis chart with six categories of offense
severity (A severity scale, Appendix H) on one axis and four
categories of parole prognosis (a salient factor score, Ap-
pendix I) on the other.
The severity scale serves as an aid to the examiner in
classifying offense behaviors for each severity level [33]
.
The salient factor score serves as an aid in determining the
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parole prognosis (potential risk of parole violation) . As
seen in Appendix I this factor uses nine elements to establish
four categories of parole prognosis (very good, good, fair,
poor) . Statistical predictions can be very helpful in giving
guidelines to recruiters as to approve or disapprove a parolee's
application.
F. OPERATION SECOND SWEEP
"Many veterans are 'marked' or worse off than criminal
offenders ... to finding employment."
[M.O. Peterson, M/Sgt., USMC, Restoration Platoon,
USDB, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas]
Another potential source of manpower is the pool of indiv-
iduals who have been discharged for less than honorable
conditions. Though not constrained via adult parolee statutes,
this group suffers a similar fate as a criminal. These indiv-
iduals were trained by the various services to fill necessary
billets. This possible source could reduce overall cost to
DOD.
It is the contention of Professor Chester A. Wright, who
has worked with both Adult Authority and the California Youth
Authority parolees, as well as other than honorably discharged
veterans that serious misconstruescious exist here. These
misconstruescious causes of society to label other than honor-
ably discharged veterans as "forever no good." Professor
Wright bases his argument on both experiences and the writings
of Erik Ericson. Professor Wright continues to state that
females close their adolescent syndrome earlier than males
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and that most females do so by age 18. Males sometimes do not
do so until they are 24 to 25 years of age. This is validated
by the fact that the state of California often keeps young men
to the ages indicated as wards of the youth authority. In
short, these persons may be 24 to 25 years of age chronolog-
ically, but much younger where psychological, sexual and social
development is concerned. Possibly the failure of the military
commanders to comprehend this developmental phenomena has
caused, not only erroneous discharges of such individuals, but
labeling them as unfit precluded their ever being redeemed by
society [5]
.
As a social worker, Professor Wright said, he often ran
into a re-occurring theme when trying to help young adults.
The theme centered around other than honorably discharged
veterans who had closed the adolescent syndrome, matured, and
while at their peak, could not find meaningful employment.
These men were willing to, go back into service or do most
anything else to clear their records [5]
.
These individuals are also stigmatized as undesirables.
They are placed in the same arena as criminal offenders [34]
.
In order to bring such valuable resources back into the U.S.
Armed Forces, they should be screened based upon age at dis-
charge and the age qualification of prior service enlistments,





Although many critics would say, "we don't want those kinds
of people among us," society must realize that these people
are human and were once considered first class citizens. An-
other real question is, "Can the U.S. afford the luxury of
past rejection in the current manpower situation?" The crim-
inal offender as defined earlier is a person who has deviated
from the law of society. These individuals continue to lose
their self-esteem and consequently fail to make good in adapt-
ing to society. Non-violent and situational offenders form
cadres great and needed resources. If the U.S., as a strong
nation, can forgive these "selected" individuals who are will-
ing to serve and contribute to national security, this group
could be very productive citizens. Of the 1.5 million non-
violent offenders in the U.S. in 1975, a significant portion
of them could have saved the taxpayer and government expenses
that are dissipated each year. These expenses are for the
training, education, and security to house and prevent offend-
ers from employment and reconvictions. Although not published
in the news media, parolees have made many self-sacrificing
contributions to society. These individuals have time and
again exposed themselves to disease and possible death for the
good of humanity. Their motives no doubt vary; perhaps no




Since World War I and II, thousands of inmates have served
in the protection of their country, thousands have given blood
to save lives, many have given skin to the badly burned, con-
tributed thousands of hours for firefighting and made donations
to help possible juvenile delinquents adjust to community life.
Many are continuing efforts in hopes of realizing their dream
of a 'second chance' [20].
The military institutions possess the awesome capacity to
make thousands of these dreams come true. In so doing, the
services would not merely produce cost-effective personnel
procurement for themselves, but they would also prevent crime
and contribute to the prevention of the amazing waste implicit
in the human cost of this country's current penal system. In
the next chapter, the author formulates a cost-benefit con-
sideration for the possible utilization of skilled parolees.
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IV. THE COST-BENEFIT CONSIDERATION OF UTILIZING
PAROLEES IN THE ARMED FORCES
A. INTRODUCTION
"In our society, manpower is a valuable resource.
The value of our military manpower goes beyond
the simple sum of their pay, allowances, and other
forms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. At
minimum, it includes the estimated value of their
future contribution to society. Furthermore under
the United States form of government there are
often political costs involved in decisions to
increase our military manpower strength."
[Tolcott and Armitage, Center for Naval Analyses]
This chapter contains evaluation, discussion and analysis
of cost-benefits inherent in utilizing skilled parolees in the
United States (U.S.) Armed Forces. To make this analysis pos-
sible, a brief background and definition of a cost-benefit
analysis is defined and a presentation of the assumptions and
facts are given. This analysis will only show a cost utiliza-
tion flow of skilled parolees, although other alternatives are
presented. As stated by Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia , Senate
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee) on the National Broad-
casting Company (NBC) Meet the Press:
"
... we have a resource problem. The Defense of
our nation is lacking both in quality and quantity
of personnel ... we cannot meet our manpower prob-
lem . . . money will not cure this problem . . . and
either we cut down our commitments or find another
source ..."
Cost benefit (or cost-effectiveness) analysis has become
in recent years a rapidly developing and highly fashionable
tool in defense and other governmental operations. Such
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analysis can be an invaluable aid to systematic and rational
decision making in complex situations involving increasingly
complex modern organizations. Yet the proper application of
cost-benefit analysis requires more than just the use of the
appropriate words. Complicated questions most often require
sophisticated analysis. Proper use of the techniques of cost-
benefit analysis requires detailed attention to the very hard
problems that arise in particular cases. This problem may be
all too easy to pass over with relatively perfunctory treat-
ment, believing that one cost-benefit analysis is much the
same as another [35]
.
The manpower shortage problem has no easy solution in
practice and the analyst may have to be satisfied with approxi-
mate or makeshift solutions. The problem of cost-benefit
analysis is to decide on a function which will reduce the
effects to a single criterion and then choose the policy which
is best according to that criterion [35]
.
Perhaps it is pertinent at this point to discuss a
problem that arises in cost-benefit analysis, particularly in
defense manpower planning. In the study of manpower systems,
interest centers around how the system utilizes its available
resources over time and thus the evaluation of the operational
effectiveness of any such system is often complicated by the
requirement of having to consider both the long term and short
term effect of any policy change proposed for the system. In
addition, the analysis problem is complicated by the require-
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merit of balancing the productivity of the system with the
benefits that accrue to individuals as they are utilized with-
in the system [36]. Ef fectiveness , however, is a matter of
what the personnel of an establishment can do, rather than who
they are, and how to reorganize the tasks performed by per-
sonnel so that the whole establishment runs most effectively.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Since 1976, the services recruiting objectives have resulted
in shortages of non prior service individuals needed to meet
manpower requirements. These shortages are based upon enlist-
ment expected rather than the actual manpower needs of active
and reserve force readiness.
According to the New York Times, September 27, 1980:
"The pool of young men and women of military age
is declining, giving the armed forces a smaller
pool from which to draw."
Although exact requirements are classified as to the number
of personnel needed, what should one think when the news media
publishes titles to reflect the need for skilled individuals
to serve in the Armed Forces as follows:
"Who'll fight for America? America is facing a
shortage of the most valuable military resource
of all: manpower."
"The Pentagon is handicapped by shortages of suf-
ficiently skilled and disciplined personnel in
all ranks."
[The Manpower Crisis, Time Magazine, June 9, 1980]
"Shortages and Inefficiencies Plague Industrial
Base of the U.S. Military."
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"Losses of Skilled Air Force People Prompt Concern
Over Its Readiness."
"Questions Raised on the Army Readiness to Engage
in Prolonged Land Conflict."
"U.S. Navy Losing Experienced People."
"Gaps in Training and Equipment Hinder Rapid
Deployment Force .
"
[The New York Times, September 22-2", 1980]
The critical question facing the U.S. Armed Forces as they
approach the 1980 's personnel shortage is, how can America ef-
fectively maximize its military manpower at minimum cost in
order to achieve its needed readiness in a manner that assures
capability fcr accomplishment of the country's missions?
1. 3ackcround
-
In 1973, there were two majcr pclicies adopted having
major significance for the manning of active and reserve forces
These were the All Volunteer Force (AVF) and Total Force (TF)
policies. The AVF ended conscription and adopted a return to
volunteer means of raising and maintaining the military
forces [37] . The volunteer force concept was designed to
compete, by and large, with civilian salaries [38].
The TF Policy placed increased reliance on reserve
forces as a primary method of augmenting the active fcrce in
the event of mobilization. Z'r.e economic rationale underlying
the TF Policy is that national security objectives can be
achieved more efficiently through a smaller active force and
greater reliance on the reserve. These policies have been
successful in achieving the Active Force recruiting and reten-
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tion goals of the early 1970s. However, the end of the draft
has caused these policies to have the opposite effect on the
ability of the reserve forces to achieve proper manning goals
both quantitatively and qualitatively [39] . Appendix J in-
dicates that the strength of the total reserve force has been
below authorized strength since the inception of the AVF.
Inability to meet authorized strength has resulted in reduc-
tions in the authorizations for some components. This most
certainly does not assist, except negatively, the overall de-
fense posture.
Figure 4-1 represents active duty end strengths by ser-
vices as of 30 September 1977. These representations further
reveal real problems existant in form of manpower shortages.
ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTH BY SERVICE
30 September 1977
CONGRESSIONAL














Source: Reserve Compensation System Study, OSD (Manpower,
Reserve Affairs and Logistics), 30 June 1978.
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As seen in Appendix J and Figure 4-1 the manpower of




To provide the reader an analysis based upon assump-
tions and documentation that the services can minimize man-
power shortfalls with minimum cost through the possible use
of skilled parolees.
3 Facts
a. As mentioned earlier, the population of the 18-24
year old youth according to demographic projections will con-
tinue to decrease in the 1980s and will continue into the
1990s.
b. That the military offender with civil convictions
are utilized and restored to active duty.
c. That there is a qualified resource of manpower in




a. That Title 10, United States Code 504 can be
amended to accept 'selective' parolees or individuals with
two or more felonies, providing that Congress perceives the
critical need to do so.
b. That civilian skills are equal to those skills
needed by the military. (Example: Skills presented in Ap-
pendix M.
)
c. That the retention rate of the skilled parolee
will be greater or preferable to that of a non prior service
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recruit. (For a skilled parolee or criminal offender who has
the human desire for a second chance, is given an added incen-
tive to erase that stigma and possibly restore the civil right
so that the individual may become a productive citizen)
.
d. That the rate of recidivism and crime will be
reduced.
3. That women are equal to men as to pay, duties and
billets.
f. That potentially 370,000 skilled parolees are
available out of the 1.5 million non-violent offenders.
5 . Alternatives
a. Reinstate the draft for young men.
b. Draft women into the military.
c. Continue the All Volunteer Force.
d. Increase pay and allowances to current purchasing
power
.
e. Extend the current six-year service obligation of
enlistees.
f. Allow skilled parolees from various institutions
to serve their country and earn a decent income, based upon
criteria discussed in the previous chapter.
Although the following alternatives are discussed
briefly, only alternative f will be given an in depth analysis
as to cost and benefits. The author chose to take this course
of review because of the large amount of research already done
on alternatives a-e and the scant amount done to date on the
potential in alternative f.
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6 . Evaluation of Alternatives
Alternative a : Reinstate the draft for young men. A
draft would assure supply while avoiding the projected cost
increases for the 1980s but it would not assure quality
recruits. The return of the draft would only impose a higher
cost of a different sort. For example, in recent drafts, each
service had a higher proportion of mental category IV (low gen-
eral qualifications via low I.Q. and education) personnel than
the volunteer force, although more category I were taken in.
A return to the draft could increase the quality and could pre-
vent a major decline in recruit quality, though the connection
between the draft and quality of recruit is neither strong nor
direct [39] .
According to the San Francisco Chronicle of 6 June
1980, the reinstatement of the draft bill is being held up in
the Senate for approval of $13.3 million as an initial start-
up cost for the selective services. The initial training cost
was nearly $3 billion in FY 1977, for an average cost per stu-
dent of roughly $17,000. About 40 percent of this cost repre-
sents student pay and allowances; the remainder covers the
cost of trainers, support personnel, other operating expenses
and small amount procurement and military construction. Most
of this cost of training and support goes for salaries of
military and civilian employees of the military establishment.
As seen by Appendix K, let one assume that initial basic
training cost for X (non prior service - raw recruit) and Z
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(non prior service - special) are equal in cost minus special-
ized skill training cost. Appendix L indicates the cost of
training and support cost by service and Appendix M shows the
relationship of military and civilian occupational structures
The draft will cause increases in cost both operation-
ally and administratively as seen in Appendix L for training
of basic and specialized skills. Those recruits who possess
skills equal to those cited in Appendix G or Appendix M will
be processed directly to the required billet to be filled.
Reviving the draft would spur young men anxious to
avoid full time duty, to join the reserves and thus solve one
of the most frustrating problems of the military [38] . How-
ever, according to the former Secretary of Defense, Melvin
Laird,
Not even the reinstitution of the draft would
solve this severe retention problem. In fact,
it would probably make the situation worse. Pre-
vious experience has demonstrated that conscripts
rarely stay behond their term of obligated ser-
vice. Moreover, even if sufficient numbers of
the draftees did stay on, it would be more than
a decade before they reached the experience
level of the third-termers who currently are
resigning [40]
.
Peacetime conscription would avoid some cost only by
transferring cost from the taxpayers as a whole to the young
persons who are drafted. Whether this 'tax' on those who are
drafted is an appropriate way for the majority of the United
States (U.S.) citizens to avoid costs is a key judgment in
assessing the desirability of an "all volunteer military."
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The administration plans to spend $47.3 billion in
fiscal year 1981 for active duty and retired pay and by 1985
to increase that to $67 billion plus a factor to account for
inflation [41]
.
Today's army reserves are some 370,000 below their
mandated peacetime level. Lets again assume that the current
regular or reserve army's needs are 370,000 recruits. The ap-
proximate total cost of these recruits are based upon the costs
in Appendix K as follows:
Type X represents those individual recruits who could
be unskilled, probably immature and inexperienced, based upon
the individual's age. Type Z represents the skilled, experi-
enced and probably the matured individual. In this case it
could be the selective parolee, based upon the selection cri-
terion discussed in the previous chapter. Cost of basic train-
ing will be the same for both types, however, if skilled,
highly motivated parolees among other skilled individuals were
to be processed through the Type Z mode, the government would
save approximately $7,000 per recruit or $2.6 billion.
TYPE NUMBER COST AMOUNT
X 370,000 x $17,000 = $6.3 billion
Z 370,000 x 10,000 = 3.7 billion
Savings: *7,000 2.6 billion




Alternative b : Draft women in the military
Increased utilization of women by the U.S. Armed Forces
is one of the methods available for dealing with the personnel
situation. This increase may take place both in terms of ex-
panding the physical locations in which women may serve (ships,
aircraft, combat areas) and the utilization of women in "non-
traditional" job areas such as mechanics and electronics [42]
.
A national survey was conducted by Naval Personnel
Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA, which revealed
that 14 percent of the women who were surveyed are interested
in joining the military [42]. However, the cost to maintain
women in the military as another source of manpower will in-
crease the total cost of manpower significantly. That is, the
current cost in alternative one plus some unknown costs for
expansion work areas (sleeping quarters, lavatories, redesign




Alternative c ; Continue the AVF
.
During this fiscal year (1980) , the Pentagon has al-
ready pushed the year's recruiting budget to $614 million,
about $100 million above the 1949 level [38]
.
Measures to resolve the nation's military manpower
problems will be costly and complex. Demographic analyses
indicate recruiting could become more difficult. In 1978
some 2.14 million American males reached 18 years of age.
This year, the figure will decline to 2.13 million, and by
1932 it will fall to 1.61 million [38].
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As mentioned earlier, according to Senator Sam Nunn,
"
... money will not cure the unique problem faced by the mili-
tary and that another source should be found."
Alternative d ; Increase pay and allowances to current
purchasing power.
According to a Pentagon study, it would take about
$5.5 billion in pay hikes right now to re-establish the rela-
tive positions which existed at the end of 1971 between the
military and the civilian power to purchase goods and services
[38] . Appendix D shows a comparison of military and civilian
pay.
"Getting -- and keeping -- top people will be
costly ..."
[LtGen Glen Otis, Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans quoted in Time Magazine]
Although the military services have received a new pay
package of 11.7 percent across the board (Basic pay, Quarters
and Subsistence) increase, the Congressional Budget Office
study finds that:
The Carter Administration's pay proposals for
fiscal year 1981, despite pay increases, would
be insufficient to meet the services needs for
enlisted recruits and maintain recruit quality
in 1980 and 1981. Nor would they be sufficient
to stem a decline in the numbers of career per-
sonnel. If the Administration's 1981 policies
were to be continued for the next five years,
problems in recruiting and retention would
probably continue or worsen.
The addition to the Administration proposal for
the pay increase recently approved by the Senate
and the President in the Nunn-Warner proposal,
which would help retain career personnel but
would do little to solve recruiting problems.
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Nevertheless, cost over the next five years would be
likely to increase by a total of about $4 billion above the
Administration's proposal levels. Increases would be even
higher if money had to be added to ensure that military pay
raises kept pace with those in the private sector.
Alternative e ; Extend the current six-year obligation
of enlistees.
In order to concentrate on greater utilization of
trained veterans, a study was conducted by the Pentagon in
1974-75 and recommended that the current six-year obligations
of enlistees be extended so that all enlistees would be subject
to recall through their 28th year of age. In practice, this
would mean an extension of obligation for most young people of
about four and one-half years [43] .
People who enlist in the active forces assume a six-
year service obligation. The final or sixth year normally is
spent in the Standby Reserve. Thus, the Individual Ready Re-
serves (IRR) is composed primarily of those who have completed
three or four years active duty enlistments, do not opt for
affiliation with a Selected Reserve unit, and have not yet
completed five years of military service. Other members of
the IRR include reservists who can no longer meet the commit-
ments of service with the Selected Reserve and men who volun-
teer to stay in the IRR beyond their statutory commitment [43]
.
Alternative f : Allow parolees from various institu-




To allow skilled parolees to honorably serve in the
military during peacetime and a national emergency is another
available source of manpower, provided that federal statutes
are amended. If such action is provided, benefits to the
taxpayer could be accrued in the following ways:
a. Reduction in Training Cost
b. Reduction in Welfare Costs
c. Increase in Government (Tax) Revenue
d. Increase in Experience and Retention Rate
e. Possible Reduction in Recruiting and Advertisement
Cost
f. Reduction in Prison and State Youth Authority
Incarceration Costs.
a. Reduction in Training Cost
Many parolees possess skills that are or could be
utilized by the services to fill billets where critical short-
falls exist and require no security clearances. Assume that
24 percent of those 1.5 million individuals mentioned in the
previous chapter are available parolees or will be paroled,
possess technical and nontechnical skills necessary to the U.S.
Armed Forces, and that these individuals qualify for the enlist-
ment criteria previously discussed. By applying this number
of 370,000 individuals to the cost data used in alternative a
or Appendix K, cost of training such individuals would be as
follows:
Type Qty Cost Total Trng Cost
Z 370,000 x $10,000 = $3.7 billion
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Compared to the same cost used for unskilled recruits, there
will be cost savings of $2.6 billion.
Although the 370,000 individuals represent 100 per-
cent, let one again assume that only 52 percent (192,400) have
the human desire (accession) for a second chance. The cost is
$1.92 billion of training cost.
Quantity Per Recruit Trng Cost Total Trng Cost
192,400 x $10,000 = $1.92 billion
b. Reduction in Welfare Cost
Welfare cost is computed by using Appendices P (Inmates
who were self-supporting prior to arrest by number of dependents)
and Q (Welfare Payment for the State of California, not includ-
ing medical care) , to determine the monthly cost to the tax-
payer through welfare payments. Approximately 192,400 (52 per-
cent) individuals are stigmatized as unemployable will have
families to support who are currently on (public assistance)
welfare. According to the Salinas Department of Welfare,
Salinas, California, California, Connecticut, and New York are
the three highest states paying welfare offices in the U.S.
[44] . The author chose the State of California as a cost cal-
culation variable as it is one of the largest, population wise,
and also the most economical source of data.
Appendix N presents cost of welfare dissipated monthly
to those individuals who now or would at some future date have
families on welfare. The welfare cost per month could be
reduced by $46.4 million, according to the author's calcula-

tions, if these prospective parolees are used in the U.S.
Armed Forces. This cost does not include medical care benefits.
c. Increase in Government (Tax) Revenue
If the same 192,400 individuals were in the military
(as computed in Appendix 0) , the government would increase its
tax revenue by a percentage of the $123.3 million a month.
The parolee or criminal offender is allowed to work their
way back to a 'second chance
'
, of being a productive citizen.
The basic pay salary was computed by using the Active Duty Pay
Table of 1 October 1979.
d. Increase in Experience and Retention Rate
Experience is the key to success. In the opinion of
the author, it helps make an organization perform more effi-
ciently and effectively. Having the skilled individual in its
midst makes government policies achieveable. According to Mr.
Robert Palmer, Polaroid Corporation:
Former inmates may be ignorant, that is many
have limited education and others are highly
skilled and experienced, but they are very
bright and quick to learn . . . training costs
are low . . . absenteeism is substantially under
regular rate. There has been almost no
turnover [45]
.
If once given an opportunity of employment there is a
greater chance that a parolee will remain in service longer
than a raw recruit. This aspect helps the individual re-
establish job security, recognition in society and a working
track record that could help erase the stigma placed on them.
79

e. Possible Reduction in Recruiting and Advertisement
Although the real cost of recruiting advertisement is
not defined, the author believes this variable could be reduced
significantly. Currently, recruiters are finding it difficult
to recruit qualified young men in the U.S. Armed Forces through
its advertising strategy, but with a population pool readily
available in a centralized area (federal or state institutions)
,
the recruiter could in fact, interview a prospective applicant
prior to release or after release from the institution and or
at the individual's parole office. The records of these
individuals are centrally located and can be obtained if one
waives their right for screening and investigation.
f
.
Reduction in Prison and State Youth Authority
Incarceration Costs
If the same 192,400 individuals were in Soledad Cor-
rection Training Facility or other institutions today, this
would cost the state government approximately $10,000 per
person or $1.9 million. This dollar amount could be reduced
and possibly produce more taxable revenues for the federal,
state, and local government.
C. CONCLUSIONS
As David T. Stanley (former member of Brookings Institution)
put it:
"Believers in parole are accustomed to point out
how much less it costs to keep an offender on
parole than in prison." [27]
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The U.S. needs another human resource to combat the de-
ficiencies of skilled and quality manpower shortages within
the U.S. Armed Forces. This human resource, although con-
sidered an undesirable, possesses all those attributes and
possibly more that DOD wants in a quality recruit. If laws
are amended to allow such skilled individuals (criminal
offenders) on a selection basis, then the military services
could meet their shortfalls in recruiting efforts and possibly
solve the manpower readiness problem.
Society (America) has a responsibility to restore these
individuals to its midst according to its creed. The author
suggests that the military would be an appropriate avenue to
channel skilled parolees into the U.S. Armed Forces. This
transitioning would be like leaving one disciplinary insti-
tution to another, but with pay and the feeling of being a
more productive and useful citizen.
In the next chapter, the author discusses the Analysis of
Success and Failure of this potential human resource and some
criteria for evaluation of this proposal.
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V. ANALYSIS: SUCCESS AND FAILURE
A. INTRODUCTION
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the potential
of civilian parolees as an unusual source of manpower. Here
the author defines and presents criteria for possible success
and failure of inducting parolees into the United States (U.S.)
Armed Forces. Also included is an analysis of inmates or
prospective parolees' attitudes toward the military service.
To close, the final conclusions and recommendations for the
utilization of this potential human resource are presented.
B. SUCCESS OR FAILURE
What is considered a success or failure? Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary, 1978 defines success as:
"the outcome, result, the degree or measure of
succeeding, the attainment of wealth, favor,
eminence or one that exceeds ,
"
and failure as:
"the omission of occurrence or performance; a
failing to perform, a duty or expected action;
a state of inability to perform a normal function,
a lack of success or one that has failed."
Many researchers in the field of criminology feel that the
chief indicator for determining success and failure is the rate
of recidivism (return to prison) or rate of lock-up [46] . As
discussed previously in Chapter III, there is no other work-
able alternative to measure success and failure than using the




"a success is one who stays out of prison or a
degree of goal achievement." [46]
However, Robert Roesch and Lonnie Fouty, two researchers of
the Florida Department of Corrections wrote, " ... there is no
standard of success or failure measurement for comparing rates
of recidivism, there is an underlying assumption that an in-
crease in the rate of recidivism is 'bad' and the decrease in
the rate of recidivism is good. Those two researchers con-
tinued to state that:
"there is no commonly accepted performance stand-
ard for determining what is an acceptable or
"good recidivism rate." Therefore, there is
no valid criteria for determining a successful
or unsuccessful program, nor is there any basis
for a rational relative comparison." [47]
John Irvin wrote in his book, "The Felon"
"It is possible for an ex-felon to be returned to
prison even though he is pursuing what he con-
siders a straight life. This is true because,
(1) the individuals may be returned to prison
while on parole without any crime proven against
them, (2) they remain vulnerable to arrest and
conviction because of their record and (3) the
individual continues to commit felonies and mis-
demeanors more frequently than those who are not
ex-felons. [46]
The author concludes that there is no measure for success
and failure. Only the individual may define what they consider
to be success or failure. Ex-convicts may continue their de-
viant careers and avoid arrest. However, these individuals
may classify themselves as a success and society, itself,
classify them as a failure.
In spite of the difficulties in assessing success in the
previous section, the author feels that a "success" in regard
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to parolees to the military should be one who completes a
required training program, stays out of trouble, fails to
return to prison, and completes a first term enlistment in
the U.S. Armed Forces. Failure is the goal not achieved, for
example, failure to complete a required training program or
the first term enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces. To con-
tinue what Roesch and Fouty said above, there is no other way
to measure success and failure for this goal. Again, the goal
may be to cheat and steal or make more money to support one '
s
needs. That is perhaps called success according to John
Irvin's book. Yet, this goal may constitute a failure within
the moral boundaries of society's law.
The author feels that in order to possibly integrate
skilled parolees into the U.S. Armed Forces, these individuals
must first, possess both the desire and the will to accept
this positive course of re-entry into society. This must be
backed by a need and desire to become a productive citizen and
possibly gain the dream of a second chance. The will to join
the military service and serve honorably is perceived to be an
economic and social reason for re-entry and social acceptance.
Those prospective parolees interviewed by the author at
Soledad Correctional Training Facility, Scledad, California,
felt that this particular program would help them in many
ways. If those ex-prisoners in the previously addressed Sri
Lanka study said: " ... if we are given a chance, we are will-
ing ... to contribute . . .
"
, then perhaps the utilization of
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the U.S.'s same untapped human resource is the answer to the
manpower shortage problem of the military as well as the prob-
lems of the overcrowded prison system.
C. ATTITUDES OF INMATES TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE
On 23 July 1980, the author conducted interviews at the
Soledad State Prison, Correctional Training Facility (minimum
security area) , Soledad, California. The purpose of these
interviews was to gather information on the attitudes of
prospective parolees toward the military service and to eval-
uate the age population, types of crimes committed and other
factors. Of the 175 inmates the author randomly selected, a
questionnaire was distributed to 137 inmates who were deter-
mined to meet eligibility requirements within the Department
of Defense (DOD) age criteria. This questionnaire is present-
ed as Appendix R. Exhibit 5-1 indicates what types of infor-
mation that was obtained through the use of this questionnaire
and the interviews that were conducted. As seen in Exhibit
5-1, 7 8 percent of those individuals the author interviewed
were between the age of 17 and 34, the average age was 21, and
the youngest was 15. Parole dates in this group ranged from
two months to two years. Most of these inmates had some type
of training and had a high school diploma or equivalent (G.E.D
Of the 137 individuals deemed eligible for the military (using
the age criteria), 55 percent were non-veterans, 96 percent
were willing to join the military service, four percent were
not willing to re-enter the Service (most individuals of the

Vietnam Era who felt bitter about the Service) . For Service
preference, 32.9 percent had no preference, 26 percent pre-
ferred the U.S. Army, 20.6 percent preferred the U.S. Navy,
19 percent preferred the U.S. Air Force, and 1.5 percent pre-
ferred the U.S. Marine Corps. The short analysis presented
was not as exhausted nor detailed as the author would have
liked it to be, nevertheless it gives at least some pertinent
information as to the desire of parolees to enter the U.S.
Armed Forces and possibly clean their slate with society.
D. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Success and failure of this thesis can be viewed from an
individual as well as an institutional level. Providing a man
or woman with an avenue of achievement and identifying them
for the military as a viable manpower source are considered by
the author to be successes at the macro-level. The possibili-
ties are there as indicated by the desire and interest which
has been expressed by the parolee. The only missing link of
this potential manpower source is that an invitation must be
extended by society and the U.S. Armed Forces in order for
these individuals to be productive.
The U.S. is beginning to learn that it cannot deal with
crime in the abstract. A crime becomes such only when a human
being commits an act that society calls a crime.
When one thinks of a criminal, one usually thinks of a
serious felon, a hardened individual, habituated to commit-
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ting serious crimes. As indicated in previous chapter and the
Sourcebook for Criminal Justice Statistics, many felons are
first offenders. Some have committed murder for self-defense.
Some have committed stupid crimes incident to ignorance and
immaturity [25] . If one lumps them together on the basis
of the type of crime they committed, then one must know them
in terms of their background and potentialities.
It is difficult to know how many felonies are committed
annually in the U.S. The best information can be obtained
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime
Reports. Thousands of these crimes were committed by persons
who will never be apprehended by the police and FBI; others
permitted to plea-bargain for less serious crimes; many others
will be acquitted by juries or will be placed on probation.
The seriousness of an offense against society depends
largely on the elements of time, place and recognition of the
individual. These offenses are always fraught with economic,
social, and political consequences. The extent of the social
harm done usually determines the attention that crimes receive
from the law enforcement agencies and society in general.
Does one remember the Watergate Break-ins? Those who were
convicted of crimes against the law of society did not go to
places like Reidsville, Folsom, San Quentin, or McNiel Island,
but instead they were placed in centers for highly notable
officials. These prisons or centers have been labeled country
clubs by critics. Yet these officials have committed offenses
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like those inmates at Soledad and other known prisons. The
environment is not the same for each class of individual. The
first time offenders at Soledad, Reidsville, or New Mexico
must survive among those inmates that are hardened criminals.
They are forced to join gangs, kill one another and/or be
taken advantage of by homosexuals. Regardless when released
all are classified as criminals. A stigma that may never go
away. Is this the same stigma for those individuals in the
Watergate?
The U.S. is confronted with old and new dilemmas such as
overcrowded prisons, unemployment, decreases in youth popula-
tion, shortages of skilled able bodied people in the military,
skyrocketing manpower cost, anti-military groups, and a host
of other factors. This myriad of ultra-complex factors indi-
cates that new methods of evaluation, placement and manage-
ment of all personnel in this country are fast becoming neces-
sary to guarantee optimum effectiveness and efficiency. This
must be done and probably in this decade if the U.S. is to
remain a free country. The author is contending that the use
of selective parolees are economically and socially cost ef-
fective to this country's outstanding military service. This
thesis has sought to analyze and present rationale arguments
supporting this unusual source and the cost effectiveness of
tapping this valuable human resource for the U.S. Armed
Forces
.
It is recommended that a 'Pilot Program' be established
to test the actual feasibility of utilizing selective skilled
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and qualified parolees, individuals on probation, individuals
with two or more felonies and possibly individuals with a less
than honorable discharge in the U.S. Armed Forces. It is also
recommended that the minimum enlistment term be approximately
three to five years to allow for the collection of data and to
enable a proper determination of success or failure of the
program. If the statistical data proves that these individ-
uals were useful to the military, then it is further recom-
mended that the current laws be amended to screen and recruit
these selective individuals into the U.S. Armed Forces.
Finally, as an incentive to serve and perform faithfully for
the U.S. Armed Forces or other government programs, the
individuals' record should be erased and all who successfully
serve should be given a clean slate.
E . SUMMARY
The author has presented and discussed the methodologies
for implementing skilled parolees into the U.S. Armed Forces.
Such implementation of this potential, available, and untapped
human resource could make up significant personnel shortfalls
that existed in the 1970s and will continue to exist in the
1980s according to demographic projections. If federal stat-
utes are amended to screen and recruit parolees, individuals
on probation, and other selected criminal offenders, then
cost savings to the government and taxpayer would be realized
monthly. This thesis addresses the benefits that are yielded
and the effectiveness of them.
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With the continuing decline of the U.S. youth population,
this country cannot afford to let this quality individual fall
by the wayside. Billions of dollars are dissipated each year
for the training, education, and housing of these individuals
in overcrowded prisons for which there is no rate of return.
It appears that this is because society cannot face the
reality of the rehabilitated individual. These individuals
possess the skills, experience, and education required to
meet any challenges of tomorrow as members of the U.S. Armed
Forces. A potential selection has been identified; it is now
society's turn to deal with the issue positively such that
this resource could be tapped. Finally, this approach to
the needed personnel acquisition when arrayed against the
social and political perceptions of present day America may
appear unusual. It is the author's contention, however, that
it is the most unusual personnel situation that the U.S. has
ever faced and will continue to exist with possibly increas-
ing intensity during the decade encompassing the 1980s. It
should therefore be valid, in light of this, for personnel





CORRECTIONAL TRAINING FACILITY, SOUTH
SOLEDAD, CALIFORNIA
Number of inmates: 450




15 - 67 years old
Average» Age: 21
Parole Expected: 2 months - 2 years
Proportion of Age # of Inmates Percentage
15 - 19 3 1.7
20 - 24 45 25.7
25 - 29 49 23.0
30 - 34 40 22.9
35 - 39 14 8.0
40 - 44 12 6.8
45 - 49 5 3.0
50 - 54 3 1.7
55 - 59 3 1.7
60 - 64
Total 175 100
Interviewees: 137 (Ages: 17 - 34)
Highest Educational Attainment: Bachelor degree
Lowest Educational Attainment: 8th grade
Majority of inmates are first termers (1 conviction)
IQ Range: Average - Outstanding
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MARITAL STATUS # OF INMATES PERCENTAGES
Single 44 32%
Married 36 26%
Separated or Divorced 57
137
42%





Those individuals that wanted to re-enter or enter the service
were:
a. Quite Willing: 79 58%
b. Willing: 52 38%
c. Not willing: 6 4%*









U.S. Air Force 25

































ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY - GENERAL INFORMATION
1-1. GENERAL . This paragraph contains general information
and administrative procedures and guidelines for effecting en-
listment and reenlistment of male and female applicants for
Naval service.
a. Prior to commencing the administrative processing
required to enlist or reenlist an applicant, the recruiter
should first review the enlistment eligibility requirements.
Recruiters are guided in determining an applicant's eligibility
by information obtained from the Application for Enlistment (DD
Form 1966), through interviews, record checks and administration
of pre-screening mental tests.
b. The preliminary interview should normally reveal the
applicant's desires towards enlisting/reenlisting , any unusual
circumstances in which he or she may be involved, his or her
status as regards age, dependency, and date and character of
last discharge if he or she has prior service; education,
selective service obligation, and such other information as may
be required by the recruiter to make a preliminary determina-
tion as to the applicant's eligibility. During this interview
the recruiter should answer any questions the applicant may
have, and provide such other information- as may be appropriate
at the time, including an explanation of the Navy's Stay in
School policy if applicable.
1-2. CHARACTER . The Navy would find it difficult to obtain
the consent of parents for their children to serve in the Navy
if they knew that their sons and daughters would be associated
with individuals who are incapable of maintaining high moral
standards. Therefore, an applicant must be able to demonstrate
at the time of enlistment that he or she is capable of maintain-
ing a satisfactory pattern of conduct. The individual who is
not of the highest moral character would certainly be a lia-
bility when visiting foreign countries as a member of the Navy
and as a representative of the United States. No juvenile
offender, however, should be barred, per se, from service in
the Navy. An individual's acceptability, insofar as character
requirements are concerned, will be determined at the time of
application after a careful review of his or her completed
file and other information available.
1-3. SPECIFIC ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS . This Chapter lists
specific eligibility requirements which must be met before an
applicant can be considered qualified for enlistment. Counsel-
ing and processing for enlisted programs should not, as a
general rule, commence until a determination has been made that
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the applicant meets the enlistment eligibility requirements.
Additional qualifications for each program are contained in
chapters 2 through 7
.
1-4. PRELIMINARY PHYSICAL/MENTAL SCREENING BY RECRUITERS .
Recruiters at activities having no medical officer assigned
may conduct interview-type preliminary physical inspection of
applicants to detect obvious disqualifying defects. If any
disqualifying physical defects are known to the recruiter, the
applicant should be tactfully informed of the requirement and
no further processing should be accomplished. Male applicants
rejected for obvious physical defects by a recruiter may obtain
a complete physical examination at a recruiting activity having
services of a medical officer. Any travel in connection there-
with will be at the applicant's expense. This practice will
not be encouraged by recruiters. At military facilities women
applicants will be examined only by a medical officer in the
presence of another woman.
a. Applicants who appear to be physically qualified should
be given a pre-screening mental test to determine whether fur-
ther processing should be continued.
b. When the applicant is determined to be apparently
eligible for enlistment/reenlistment , formal processing must
be accomplished to make a final determination as to his or her
eligibility and acceptability.
1-5. GENERAL WAIVER INFORMATION
a. Applicants who require a waiver of any enlistment
eligibility requirement or program qualification shall not be
processed unless they are considered to be particularly
desirable applicants.
b. Unless otherwise specified, requests for waiver con-
sideration of enlistment eligibility requirement or program
qualification and requests for determination of suitability
for enlistment (including paygrade determinations) will be
submitted to Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (Attn: Code
33) utilizing the following procedures:
(1) The applicant's pre-enlistment kit (with all com-
pleted forms and documents required to effect the enlistment
of the individual) will be forwarded to COMNAVCRUITCOM with a
letter of waiver request as shown in paragraph 8-1-35. Any
other substantiating documents and pertinent facts of the case
not included in the basic pre-enlistment kit should also be
forwarded. To preclude the loss of pre-enlistment documents
which are submitted to COMNAVCRUITCOM (Code 33) for waiver,
the pre-enlistment documents should be securely stapled to the
letter of waiver request. Original documents are not required
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(photocopies are acceptable) except in the case of drug abuse
waivers which require the original and two copies of the USN
Drug Abuse Certificate (NAVCRUIT 1133/7)
,
properly executed,
and the original of the Drug Abuse Circumstances for Waiver
Consideration Questionnaire (NAVCRUIT 1133/8)
.
(2) Except as provided for in paragraph 1-1-4 of this
chapter, in addition to completed forms and documents required
by Chapter 8 of this manual, the applicant's pre-enlistment kit
must include, where applicable, a handwritten statement by the
applicant explaining the circumstances and full details of the
following:
(a) The receipt of a disqualifying reenlistment
code or other than an honorable discharge.
(b) Any period (s) of lost time or UCMJ conviction (s)
including non-judicial punishment awarded during any previous
term(s) of military service.
(c) All civil offenses (except minor traffic and
minor non-traffic offenses where maximum fine is $25.00 or
less) .
(3) Any handwritten statements required by subparagraph
(2) above will be included in Item 37 of the DD Form 1966.
c. Telephonic waiver actions are not authorized except as
follows
:
(1) Nuclear Field telephonic waivers for experimental
use of marijuana, minor civil violations, algebra grade
deficiencies, and age.
(2) ATF-RM and SUBFARER telephonic waivers for
experimental use of marijuana.
d. Waivers of enlistment eligibility requirements or pro-
gram qualifications indicated as "(NOT Waiverable) , " or words
to that effect, in this manual are not authorized and should
not be requested.
e. Final determination of acceptability for applicants
who have been involved with civil authorities will be made
after considering the following factors:
(1) Evaluation and recommendation of Commanding Officer
(2) Recruiter's evaluation and recommendation
(3) Nature of offense (s) and degree of participation
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(2) It would be impossible to list all specific con-
siderations taken by the reviewing officers for each different
type of waiver request. Generally, reviewing personnel are
looking for specific evidence that the applicant has demon-
strated, beyond verbal assurances, an ability to overcome the
deficiencies which required a request for waiver. Assumptions
on the part of recruiting personnel that certain aspects of an
applicant's personality and behavior are inherently clear and
understood are often detrimental in that reviewing officers
must, of necessity, refrain from making any assumptions of this
type.
(3) The single most important aspect of a waiver re-
quest is the recommendation made by the commanding officer.
While even the strongest recommendation cannot make a non-
competitive applicant competitive, it does serve to influence
significantly the outcome of determinations when an applicant
cannot demonstrate overwhelming potential, yet is not suf-
ficiently below standards as to warrant disapproval of the
request. Specific recommendations are desired. An endorse-
ment merely forwarding a request will not be considered a
favorable recruiter recommendation.
(4) There is often a feeling that reviewing officers,
who do not have personal contact with applicants, disapprove
more requests than would field recruiters who are in close
personal contact with applicants. Two things are important to
remember in this regard. First, requests received at COMNAV-
CRUITCOM Headquarters are normally for more serious deficien-
cies than those for which waiver authority has been delegated
to the field level. Second, in all determinations for waiver
of eligibility requirements or program qualifications, a de-
tached, objective viewpoint is necessary to ensure that the
primary mission of Navy Recruiting Command is achieved success-
fully.
h. Navy recruiting district commanding officers may
authorize their executive officer to grant "by direction" any
or all enlistment waivers which are within the CO, NAVCRUIT-
DIST's authority to grant. The "by direction" authority must
be granted in writing and contain specific guidance concerning
scope, procedures and criteria which are consistent with
CRUITMAN-ENL and acceptable to the commanding officer.
A) i. Authority of acting commanding officers. Article
0817(1), Navy Regulations, 1973, provides that "an officer who
succeeds to command due to incapacity, death, departure on
leave, detachment without relief, or absence due to orders
from competent authority of the officer detailed to command




1-6. DOCUMENTATION OF WAIVER APPROVAL
a. When a waiver of any eligibility requirement for en-
listment, reenlistment or an enlisted program is authorized,
documentation in the applicant's service record must be made.
(1) Except for drug abuse waivers, waivers granted by
Commander, Navy Recruiting Command and Navy Recruiting Area
Commanders must be documented by inclusion of the original
authorization letter in the applicant's service record, by
counter signatures of the interviewing officer and the recruit-
ing district commanding officer in Item 35 of the Application
for Enlistment (DD Form 1966), if applicable, and by the re-
cruiting district commanding officer's signature in Section VI
of the DD Form 1966. Drug abuse waivers must be documented
in accordance with paragraph 1-1-4.
(2) Except for drug abuse waivers, waivers granted by
Commanding Officer, Navy Recruiting Districts must be document-
ed in the applicant's service record by the Recruiting District
Commanding Officer's signature in Item 35 of the Application
for Enlistment (DD Form 1966), if applicable, and in Section
VI of the Application for Enlistment. Pre-service drug abuse
waivers must be documented in accordance with paragraph 1-1-4.
b. Delegation of CO, NAVCRUITDIST ' s documentation of
waiver authority:
(1) Navy recruiting district commanding officers may
authorize their executive officer to sign ALL enlistment
waivers "by direction." This authority will be in writing and
contain specific guidance concerning scope, procedures and
criteria which are consistent with CRUITMAN-ENL and acceptable
to the commanding officer.
(2) Navy recruiting district commanding officers may
authorize their Of ficer-in-Charge of Class "A" stations to
sign enlistment waivers "by direction." This authority will
be in writing and contain specific guidance concerning scope,
procedures and criteria which are consistent with CRUITMAN-
ENL and acceptable to the commanding officer. Additionally,
this written authority will specify that the of ficer-in-charge
may only sign "by direction" following case-by-case approval
from the parent NAVCRUITDIST CO or XO. The NAVCRUITDIST CO/XO
approval will be based on necessary documentation for the
waiver. This documentation may be telecopied by the officer-
in-charge to the parent NAVCRUITDIST. The approved documenta-
tion will be retained by the NAVCRUITDIST and become a per-
manent part of the applicant's residual file.
(3) The CO, NAVCRUITDIST is required to ensure full
compliance with the enlistment waiver "by direction"
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authorization. As a minimum, the CO will personally review
and document at least 15 percent of the "by direction" waiver
case residual files each month. The CO will sign his name in
Item 37 of the DD Form 1966, signifying that he has reviewed
that waiver case.
(4) The Of ficer-in-Charge, Standardization and Audit
Team (SAT) will, during the NAVCRUITDIST ' s SAT audit, sample
residual files and active kits containing "by direction" en-
listment waivers to ensure compliance with COMNAVCRUITCOM
policy.
(5) Navy recruiting area commanders will, during the
NAVCRUITDIST 1 s administrative inspection, sample residual
files and active kits containing "by direction" enlistment
waivers to ensure compliance with COMNAVCRUITCOM policy.
c. Except for drug abuse waivers, telephonic waivers
granted by COMNAVCRUITCOM and CNO (OP-132D) for eligibility
for the Nuclear Field Program must be documented in the ap-
plicant's service record. After receiving telephonic approval,
the Recruiting District Commanding Officer must sign in Item
35 of the Application for Enlistment (DD Form 1966) , if ap-
plicable, and in Section VI of the Application for Enlistment.
Pre-service drug abuse telephonic waivers must be documented
in accordance with paragraph 1-1-4.
d. A copy of any other waiver approval correspondence
will be included in the applicant's service record.
e. The AFEES Liaison Petty Officer will enter appropriate
waiver codes in Item 20e of the Application for Enlistment (DD
Form 1966) in accordance with instructions contained in Chapter
8, Section I of this manual.
D)
1-7. MANDATORY REJECTION/WAIVERS NOT AUTHORIZED . Applica-
tions for enlistment from individuals in the following cate-
gories will be rejected:
a. Any applicant who is awaiting trial, awaiting sen-
tence, or on supervised conditional probation or parole.
b. Any applicant who has been placed on probation or
given a suspended or deferred sentence contingent on his or
her enlistment.
c. Any applicant who has had charges dismissed or who has
been released from probation, suspended sentence, or any other
form of civil restraint for the purpose of enlisting.
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d. Any applicant who has:
(1) been addicted, or physically or mentally dependent
on any drug;
(2) been a trafficker of illegal drugs;
(3) abused narcotics within the past year;
(4) abused dangerous drugs within the past six months.
e. Any applicant whose religious beliefs conflict with
the principle that voluntary enlistees/reenlistees are subject
to unrestricted service on a 24-hour-a-day , seven-day-a-week
basis.
f. Any applicant who has reservations about military ser-
vice due to religious, moral or ethical reasons.
g. A woman applicant who is pregnant.
1-8. TREATMENT OF REJECTED APPLICANTS
a. Rejected applicants must be made to feel that the Navy
also regrets that they cannot be accepted and that their inter-
est in the Navy is sincerely appreciated. At any time recruit-
ing personnel consider that the rejection of an applicant may
be cause for disrupting good local community relations, all
pertinent information bearing on the situation shall be for-
warded to the Navy Recruiting District for consideration and
further disposition. Those potential rejection cases which
are likely to stimulate interest on the part of national or
state officials shall be forwarded to COMNAVCRUITCOM (Code 33)
for final action.
b. In complying with DOD Instruction 1115.5, Navy recruit-
ing activities will establish mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments with local offices of the State Employment Services by
urging those applicants not qualified for enlistment to visit
the local State Employment Service Office to obtain assistance
in pursuing their civilian careers.
c. The recruiter is responsible for informing an applicant
that he does not qualify for enlistment in the active military
service.
Source: NAVY RECRUITING MANUAL (ENLISTED) , COMNAVCRUITCOM
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am responding to your letter of 18 February 1980 to Senator John Sttnnls,
Ihalrman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It appears that only
iuestlons 8, 9 and 10 pertain to the Department of Defense.
longress has established a set of rules governing the enlistment of Individuals
<ho have been convicted of a felony. Title 10 United States Code, Section 504,
itates that "No person who . . . has been convicted of a felony, may be enlisted
in an Armed Force. However, the Secretary concerned may authorize exceptions
n meritorious cases, for the enlistment of . . . persons convicted of felonies."
Jersons convicted of a single felony count may request a waiver to permit their
tnllstment. The waiver procedure 1s not automatic, and approval 1s based on
jach Individual case. Waivers are not granted to Individuals who have been con-
Hcted of two or more felonies. One of the considerations 1n determining whether
i waiver will be granted 1s the Individual's ability to successfully adjust to
:1v1l1an life for a period of time following release from judicial constraint.
VI though many Incarcerated persons would prefer to "serve" their sentence 1n
:he military, the Department of Defense must abide by the legal constraints
nentloned above. These restrictions apply to volunteers and draftees alike.
It the present time, there are no plans to request amendment to Title 10 to
illow "Immediate" enlistment of new parolees. (See prior correspondence, attached.)
[ hope this Information answers any questions you may have concerning the enlist-
ment of convicted felons Into the U.S, Armed Forces. For answers to your other
questions, It 1s recommended that you contact the Department of Justice, 900
Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20530.
Sincerely






CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW STANDARD MEN
The following is a profile of New Standards men accepted by-
revised mental standards during the period October 1966 -




Average years 20.3 20.2
2. RACE
% who were non-White 41.2% 9.1%
3. EDUCATION
% high school graduates 45.2%
Number school grades completed
(avg.) 10.6
% who failed or repeated
school grades 47.0%
4. ACADEMIC ABILITY
Reading, median grade 6.3
% reading below 4th grade 13.3%
Arithmetic, median grade 6.3
5. ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST
Median percentile score 13.6
6. PRE-SERVICE CIVIL COURT CONVICTIONS











Civil Court Convictions of New Standards Men
Number of Convictions Percent of Men
90.8%
1 6.1
2 or more 3.1
Total 100.0'
Typical Weekly Income of
New Standards Men Prior to Military Service





61 and Above 42.6
Total 100.0%
Source: Project 100,000, Character and Performance of New
Standard Men, Office of Secretary of Defense





Fromt DeQuincey A. Davis, SVC#1205 Naval Fos graduate
School, Monterey, California 939^0
To: Director, Department of Corrections
Subjj Farolees in the Military, Studies of
End: (1) Questionnaire
Dear Sir:
I am a student and officer attending the Naval Fostgraduate
School. Presently, I am interested in research of the feasibi-
lity for utilizing skilled parolees in the United States Armed
Forces from federal and state institutions.
The purpose of my research is to make a comparative analyses
of parolee qualifications to meet military requirements as a source
to fill billets at various levels of the military service. The
placement of parolees today will be beneficial for the taxpayer,
the government and at least the individual, whereby he or she re-
gains some recogntion into society. Although with an idea of this
nature is quite unusual, how long do we continue to let our genera-
tion fall by the wayside?
It is very difficult for a parolee to get employment, knowing
that the individual had a criminal record. The employer is very
reluctant to hire them because of their past and what happens is
they return to the institution and consequently, irretrivably lost
to society. Millions of taxpayer's dollars are dissipated each year
because we as a system, reject them and can not deal with a convicted
person. By allowing them a second chance to exhibit their values to
society, will drastically reduce the rate of recidivism and other
pertinent factors.
It is requested that information be provided in order to aevelop
studies in this area per enclosure (1). Upon completion of my thesis,
a copy will be forwarded by request.
Thank you for your cooperation, comments, information, and other
referrals
.
Respectfully , ,-a \
DeQuincey A. D^vis
/








What type of Educational and Training Programs available to
prisoners?
2. What jobs do prisoners and parolees qualify from your Educational
and Training Programs?
3- What is the success and failure rate and some causes of the curren
parole system?
k. What are the rights of parolees?
5- Do parolees have Equal Employment Opportunity rights?
6. What restrictions do parolees have?
7. What is the rate of recidivism?
8. In your opinion, do you feel that a parolee or prisoner would
consider active duty military after being incarcerated?
9. Can the law compel a convicted person to serve in the military?
10. If you were considering implementing the alternative for using
parolees in the military structure, how would you proposed to
i. implement such source of manpower?
11. What statistical data is available about prisoners and their date
of release for parole?
12. 'What data can you provide regarding the following categories?




















1st Class Petty Officer
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Tool & Die Maker*
Radio TV Repairman











1. Auto Body Repair- 6,
man 7
,











































Number-March 6, 19 "4
7-IH 9 2163.3
1. Lithographer*







































Tool i lie Designer*







1. Air Co nil tic nine 4.
- Refrigeration 5.











Binder".' Finisher* 9. lithe Platemaker*
Bindery Graphics 10. lithe Stricter *
Arts Finisher* 11. Litho Web Press
lithe let lecher* :reratcr*
lithe lamera 12. Photoengraving
2perator* 13 . Prrcf Press :eera
lithe Press PeeeerI4. ?et:rra*.tre T
Sheet Pee Metal)*15. Machinist
lithe Press Feeder*
Sheet Pee P = cer
lithe Press
:perater x .Sheet
Pee Met ai }
litne Press Iterator
:perator* (Sheet






Registration 1. Air Conditioning 10
Number-September 29, 1975 - Refrigeration 11
N-90088 2. Automobile Mechanicl2
3. Baker 13
4. Bricklayer 14
5. Cabinet Maker 15
6. Carpenter 16























Number-January 19, 1977 2
N-91031
Carpenter 3. Painter







Registration 1. Cook 4
Number-April 5, 1977 2. Painter
N-91034 3. Machinist*
ASHLAND
Registration 1. Bricklayer 9

























1. Baker 3. Plumber























Registration 1. Cook 5. Painter



























































































































































Lawn and Garden Repair
Offset Printing























El Reno Auto Mechanics
Building Construction
Food Preparation




Tool and Die Making

































































Institution Occupation Education Program Accrediting Agency































Tool and Die Design



































Heating & Air Conditioning
Solar Energy Heating & Cooling
Electronics














American Society of Mech-

































Institution Occupational Education Program Accrediting Agency





























































Refrigeration, Heating S Air
Conditioning
Sales Processing














by the NORTH CENTRAL
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES













































































Seagoville Auto Mechanics National Institute for
Automotive Service Ex-
cellence & Chrysler,







Heating & Air Conditioning
Machine Shop






Trade & Technical Schools
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Institution Occupational Education Program Accrediting Agency











































































nical College & Indiana
State Barber Board
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Aircraft llijarkini'
Druit-a:
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(Greater than above—however, specific ranges are not yiven due
to the limited number of cases and the extreme variations in
severity possible within the category)
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to the limited number of cases and the extreme
severity pussible within the category)
nut given due
varical.oiis in
.bla i.-d • -
-f .c K.e.-.'./ .< : z *e-a- ^ a" L - '• •» aa a -i alcai • ..w tW piaam «-alc«»arj
aaf * - .»tej
'a aftiaaV kaaVaaaVtaaT • * - mi* ' ^ 1 - _; a * .Cafury. the Oaajaal aasraoua aJBa| t - a^| .%*.*.
I If an u/Tcnae uenavior r:vadvcd muflip.e >« * «.r fi a t a .lie aevciily level may ba .n«:r a.aaa.^J.
a
-awe II In I. , • i . . ... v -a»c <!;. ,.r.illw«
' < % ai.c i. aUJ .-... . .-a. - -cl aQd piaHI a*i ^erfurnian^e
'








No prior convictions (adult or juvenile) = 2
One or two prior convictions - 1
Three or more prior convictions —
Item U
No prior incarcerations (adult or juvenile) = 2
One or two prior incarcerations = 1
Three or more prior incarcerations =
Item C




Commitment offense did not involve auto theft = 1
Otherwise =
Item E
Never had parole revoked or been committed for a new
offense while on parole = 1
Otherwise =
Item P
No history of heroin or opiate dependence = 1
Otherwise —
Item G
Has completed 12th yrade or received GED = 1
Otherwise —
Item H
Verified employment (or full-time school attendance) for a












SELECTED CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD
(000)
CAREER FIELD REQ INV SHORTAGES SH/REQ
Total 21.4 13.0 8 .4 39
03-Infnty 8.7 5.5 3 .2 37
04-Logistics .3 .1 .2 67
08-Arty 1.7 .9 .8 46
13-Engr 2.3 2.0 .3 13
18-Tank/Amphib 1.3 .6 .7 54
21-Ordnance .7 .4 .3 36
2 5 -Op Comm 4.0 2.4 1 .6 40
26-Telecomm Maint .7 .3 .4 65
60-Aircraft Maint 1.6 1.1 .5 29



























*As of 31 December 1976
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U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE
ENLISTED STRENGTH SHORTAGES*





SHORTAGE % OF TOTAL
Total 9.6 58
BOATSWAIN MATE 2.0 1.4 .6 33
RADAR MAN .2 .1 .1 50
GUNNERSMATE .3 .1 .2 67
MACHINERY TECH 2.5 1.5 1.0 40
SUBSISTENCE SPEC .4 .2 .2 50
RADIOMAN .6 .2 .4 67
SEAMAN/FIREMAN 6.9 1.3 5.6 80
PORT SECURITY 3.0 2.0 1.0 33
INVESTIGATOR .4 .4 100
*As of December 31, 1976
ENLISTED STRENGTH SHORTAGES
SELECTED CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELDS*
ARMY RESERVE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
(000)
CAREER FIELD REQ INV SHORTAGE SH/REQ
Total 304.8 207.1 97.6 32
11-Manuver
combat arms 115.1 81.1 34.0 30
13-Field Arty 41.5 24.9 16.6 40
12-Combat Engr 34.2 22.0 12.2 36
16-ADA 5.2 3.1 2.1 40
51-Gen Engr 29.4 19.7 9.7 33
52-Pwr Prodn 6.4 3.2 3.2 50
55-Wire/Ctrl
Maintenance 13.8 9.9 3.9 28
64-Transptn 14.6 9.9 4.7 32
67-Aviation 2.5 1.0 1.5 60
72-Telecom 16.5 14.2 2.3 14
76-Supply/Srve 25.6 18.2 7.3 29
*As of 28 February 1977
Source: Reserve Compensation System Study, OSD (Manpower,




ESTIMATED TRAINING COST FOR

















(without skills) (with skills)
X Non Prior Service (NPS) Raw Recruit
Z Non Prior Service Special (NPSS) Special Recruit with Skill
* Computed based upon approximation




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECRUIT AND SPECIALIZED SKILL
TRAINING AND SUPPORT COSTS PER STUDENT; STAFF-STUDENT
RATIOS FISCAL YEAR 1977
Marine Air




Student a/ $140 $60 $73 $95
Approximate Training
and Support Costs per
Graduate b/ $980 $540 $858 $570




Student a/ $249 $167 $202 $255
Approximate Training
and Support Costs per
Graduate b/ $2,316 $685 $2,161 $2,295
Staff-Student Ratio 1:1.4 1:1.6 1:1.3 1:1.3
Sources: Derived from data published in the Military Manpower
Training Report for FY 1977
, Department of Defense,
March 1976, p. IX-3; and Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, Hearings on the Fiscal Year 1977 Defense
Authorization
,
94-2, 1976, Part 7, pp. 4467, 4484.
a/ Excludes student pay and allowances.
b/ Cost per student-week times average length of training.
Also excludes student pay and allowances. This measure
does not fully reflect losses during training (trainees
who fail to graduate) . True costs per graduate would be





ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND COMPARABLE CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS
ENLISTED OCCUPATIONAL GROUP CIVILIAN EQUIVALENTS (1960 CENSUS)






Airplane mechanics and repairmen
Technicians, electrical & Electronic:
radio and television mechanics
and repairmen
Radio operators
Medical and dental technicians:
attendants, hospitals and other
institutions;
therapists & healers, N.F.C.
attendants, physicians' and
dentists' offices
Sailors and deck hands : boatmen
Clerical and kindred workers, N.E.C.:
secretaries; typists; file clerks,
stenographers
Stock clerks and storekeepers;
shipping and receiving clerks
Cooks; bakers; meat cutters;
kitchen workers, N.E.C., waiters;




Automobile mechanics and repairmen
Personnel and labor relations workers
Firemen, fire protection
Draftsmen; surveyors; chainmen,
rodmen and axmen, surveying
All construction craftsmen and
apprentices
:
air conditioning, heat and refrig-
eration mechanics; power station
operators; stationary firemen
Bus drivers; taxi drivers and chauf-
feurs; truck and tractor drivers
Machinists; welders and flame cutters;
tinsmiths, coppersmiths and sheet
metal workers; blacksmiths; heat
treaters, etc.: apprentices




Source: Wool, Harold, The Military Specialist Skilled Manpower for the



















CALCULATIONS OF WELFARE PAYMENTS
MEMBERS IN BASIC COST + TOTAL
FAMILY FOOD STAMPS # OF INMATES DOLLARS
1 $262 30,784 $ 8.1
2 $351 32 f 708 11.5
3 $450 23,088 10.4
4 $539 28,860 15.6
5* $401* 1,924 .8
$46.4
million
*Average # Members from One Through Four
and the Average Basic Cost Plus Food Stamps
Source: Public Information Office, Department of Welfare,
Salinas, California and a Percentage of the National




ARMED FORCES CALCULATION OF PAYMENTS
BAQ/
RATE SALARY BAQ/DEP WITHOUT DEP # INDIVIDUALS BAS
E-l $449 $161 $92 192,400 $96.30
WITH DEPENDENTS: SALARY IS $706 117,364
TOTAL: $82.8 million
WITHOUT DEPENDENTS: SALARY IS $541 75,036
TOTAL: $40.5 million
TAXABLE REVENUE: $123.3 million
























#MEMBER IN FAMILY BASIC MO. COST + FOOD STAMPS + MEDICAL CARE
* 1 $252 10 unknown
** 2 $331 20 unknown
*** 3 $410 40 unknown
**** 4 $487 52 unknown
* wi fe
** wi fe & child
*** wi fe & 2 children
**** wi fe Si 3 children






2. Physical Condition: Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor.
3. Highest Grade Completed:
4. College degree: Yea, No, Some college.
5. Work Experinces and length of each:
Vocational Skills:
7. Crimes committed:
8. Have you ever been paroled? Yes, No.
9. Harried: ,Single: , Oivorcedi
Any children? Yes, No. How many?
10. What activities do you like to participate in?
11. Would you enlist in the Armed Force, using the skill you possess, a
minimum or 3 - 5 years? (Check One Below)
Quite Willing:
Willing:
Mot Willing: (If this one is check., StopHere and retjrr, to ae
)
12. How long would you consider other than the minimum above for enlisting
in the Armed Forces.
137

13. What service would you ^unmjer {or enlistment?
AIR FORCE:
, US ARMY: , US MARINES: , US NAVY:
MILITARY RESERVES:
14. Could this opportunity help you re-establish yourself in society?
Why?




1. Monterey Peninsula Herald ; Los Angeles Times Service,
p. 5C, March 30, 1980.
2. The Crippling Squeeze on Pay in the Services, U.S. News
and World Report
, pp. 49-50, March 31, 1980.
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Executive
, p. 22, March 1980.
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Development, Manpower Administration, U.S. Department
of Labor, 1973.
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,
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8. Marginal Men and Military Service
, p. 213, Department of
Army, December 196 5.
9
.
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December 1969.
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Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San
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Forces, p. 53-75, Office of the Assistant Secretary of




13. Coffey, Kenneth J., Strategic Implications of the All
Volunteer Force
, pp. 100-107, The University of North
Carolina Press, 1979.
14. Section 10(h) of the Military Selective Service Act of
1967, (Public Law 40, 90th Congress) , as amended by
1971 Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act
(Public Law 129, 92nd Congress).
15. Riskin, Leonard L. , "Removing Impediments to Employment of
Work-Release Prisoners," Criminal Law Bulletin , v. 8,
No. 9, p. 761, November 1972.
16. Milan, M.A. and Smith, R.R., A Survey of Ex-Offender
Employment Policies of American Correctional Agencies
,
p. 1, Experimental Manpower Laboratory for Correction
Rehabilitation, Research Foundation, Montgomery, AL.
17. Delgoda, J. P., "An Ex-prisoner Cooperative: A New Experiment
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